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ABSTRACT
In today’s network, various stand-alone security services and/or proxies are used to provide 
different security services. These individual security systems implementing one single security 
function cannot address security needs of evolving networks that require secure protocol such 
as IPSec.
In this paper, we provide a framework for implementing IPSec security functions in a well 
structured functional architecture. The proposed architecture is modular and allows for 
composing software applications from products commercially available and developed by 
different suppliers to implement the entire security requirements of IPSec protocol.
In addition the proposed architecture is robust in the sense that it supports open standards and 
interfaces, and implements security functions of IPSec as an integrated solution under a unified 
security management system.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IV
DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to my wife, Rose (Zohreh Heshmatzadeh), who supported me all the 
way and stands beside me. Her enthusiasms for my future have always kept me going and her 
prayers are always with me. Her patient is most recognized and appreciated.
I also dedicate my work to my family, who always give me boundless supports, especially 
to my sons, Arash and Arman, to encourage them to reach for higher education and for better life.
Finally, I would dedicate not only this work but also my entire success, to my beloved 
father. I would consider myself extremely lucky and successful if  I could be half of what he was.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to thank my academic advisor, Prof. Shervin Erfani, for his guidance and 
support, especially for letting me to use his patent on “5-Layer Security Architecture”, and lead me 
all the way through to achieve the novelty of “A Framework for IPSec Functional Architecture”.
A special thanks to Mr. Karim Zarafshan for his active support. His encouragements were 
always my guiding light during the time o f my Master’s Degree studies at the University of 
Windsor.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................I
DEDICATION............................................................................................................................ II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................................... I ll
LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................................... VII
LIST OF TABLES...................................................................................................................... X
LIST OF ACRONYMS.............................................................................................................  XI
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION..............................................................................1
1.1 Introduction................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Network Security ...............................................................................................  5
1.1.1 Introduction to Network Security......................................................... 6
1.1.2 Introduction to Security T hreats........................................................ 7
1.1.3 Common type of network A ttacks.................................................... 10
1.2 TCP / IP O verview ................................................................................................. 16
1.2.1 Introduction..............................................................................................16
1.2.2 TCP/IP Protocol Architecture............................................................... 16
1.3 Cryptography Tools and Techniques.....................................................................22
1.3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 22
1.3.2 Cryptographic...........................................................................................22
1.3.3 Encryption Concepts and Algorithm.....................................................23
1.3.4 Hashing Concepts and Algorithms........................................................ 29
1.3.5 Authentication Mechanisms................................................................... 34
CHAPTER II INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY (IPSEC) ARCHITECTURE..38
2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 38
2.2 IPSec Implementation in TCP/IP S tack ............................................................... 40
2.3 The IPSec Roadm ap................................................................................................41
2.4 How IPSec Works....................................................................................................42
2.5 IPSec Modes..............................................................................................................44
2.6 Security Associations...............................................................................................45
2.6.1 Security Associations (SA) C oncept......................................................45
2.6.2 Security Associations D atabases........................................................... 47
2.7 IPSec Principle of Operation...................................................................................48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III IPSec PROTOCOLS:............................................................................ 53
3.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................53
3.2 The Authentication Header ( AH) Protocol......................................................... 53
3.2.1 The Authentication Header ( AH) Protocol...........................................53
3.2.2 AH Protocol Form at................................................................................. 54
3.2.3 AH M odes.................................................................................................. 57
3.2.3.1 AH Transport Mode............................................................................57
3.2.3.2 AH Tunnel Mode................................................................................ 58
3.2.4 AH Processing........................................................................................... 60
3.2.4.1 Outbound Processing...........................................................................60
3.2.4.2 Inbound Processing.............................................................................61
3.3 The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Protocol......................................... 62
3.3.1 ESP Protocol Concept...............................................................................62
3.3.2 ESP Protocol Form at................................................................................64
3.3.3 ESP M odes................................................................................................ 66
3.3.3.1 ESP Transport Mode........................................................................ 67
3.3.3.2 ESP Tunnel Mode.............................................................................68
3.3.4 ESP Processing.......................................................................................... 70
3.3.4.1 Outbound Processing...................................................................... 70
3.3.4.2 Inbound Processing...........................................................................72
3.4 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol........................................................ 74
3.4.1- IKE Protocol Concept................................................................................ 74
3.4 .2-ISAKM P ....................................................................................................... 76
3.4.3- Exchanges and Phases................................................................................ 78
3.4.3.1 Exchange Phases................................................................................ 78
3.4.3.2 Exchange Modes................................................................................ 79
3.4.4- Oakley Groups.............................................................................................. 81
CHAPTER IV A FRAMEWORK FOR IPSec FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE.82
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 82
4.2 IPSec Functional Architecture............................................................................... 84
4.2.1- IPSec Policy & Business Management Function layer....................... 85
4.2.1.1 IPSec policy Concepts................................................................... 85
4.2.1.2 IPSec Policy Management Function layer.................................. 88
4.2.2- IPSec Management Function Layer....................................................... 89
4.2.3- IPSec Security Service Function Layer..................................................90
4.2.4- IPSec security Mechanism Layer........................................................... 91
4.2.5- IPSec Primitive Function Layer..............................................................93
4.3 IPSec Protocol Handling Function.......................................................................95
4.4 IPSec Security Management Information Base (IPSec SMIB).......................96
4.5 IPSec Functional Layers Summary..................................................................... 97
1.1. Location of IPSec Architecture.................................................................................... 98
VIII
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V IP S e c  S C E N A R I O S ..............................................................................100
5.1 IPSec Scenario........................................................................................................100
5.1.1 IPSec Scenario 1....................................................................................... 100
5.1.2 IPSec Scenario 2 ....................................................................................... 105
5.1.3 IPSec Scenario 3........................................................................................106
5.2 IPSec Deployment.................................................................................................107
5.2.1- Virtual Private Network (VPN).............................................................108
CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION............................................................................................. 110
6.1 Conclusion...............................................................................................................110
6.2 Concluding Remarks.............................................................................................. I l l
6.3 Future W ork............................................................................................................ I l l
REFEREN CES............................................................................................................................ 112
A PPEN D IC ES............................................................................................................................116
Appendix A1
o IPv4 Datagram Format.......................................................................................... 116
o IPv6 Datagram Format.......................................................................................... 122
Appendix A2
- Fields for the SA................................................................................................123
Appendix A3
The objects stored in Security Database........................................................125
Appendix A4
- ISAKMP Header Format............................................................................... 128
Appendix B
o Preshared Keys Overview and Types.................................................................. 140
VITA AUCTORIS  ..................................................................................................  142
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Protocols at the four layers of the TCP/IP protocol su ite ..................................... 17
1.2 Encapsulation and de-capsulation of data as it goes down and up the
protocol stack, respectively.......................................................................................... 18
1.3 Schematic Example for Symmetric Cryptography.................................................. 24
1.4 Schematic Example for Asymmetric Cryptography............................................... 28
1.5 A keyed hashing function (M A C )............................................................................... 31
1.6 Digital signature generation...........................................................................................36
2.1 IPSec Encryption not evident in application............................................................. 40
2.2 IPSec Roadmap (this figure has been reproduced from the draft with
permission of the authors)........................................................................................... 41
2.3 IPSec in Transport M od e..............................................................................................44
2.4 IPSec Tunnel M od e........................................................................................................44
2.5 Outbound IPSec Processing..........................................................................................49
2.6 packet form at...................................................................................................................50
3.1 Procedure for Authenticated IP Datagram............................................................... 54
3.2 IPSec AH Protocol Form at.......................................................................................... 55
3.3 Authentication Header Format...................................................................................55
3.4 AH relative to other IPv4 header fields, in transport mode.................................. 57
3.5 AH relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in transport mode.........................58
3.6 AH relative to other IPv4 header fields, in tunnel m od e...................................... 59
3.7 AH relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in tunnel mode............................. 59
3.8 IPSec ESP Protocol Form at........................................................................................ 64
3.9 ESP Packet Format........................................................................................................65
3.10 IP Datagram with Transport ESP Mode.................................................................. 67
3.11 ESP relative to other IPv4 header fields, in transport mode..............................68
3.12 ESP relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in transport mode.....................68
3.13 ESP relative to other IPv4 header fields, in tunnel mode...................................69
3.14 ESP relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in tunnel mode.......................... 69
3.15 IKE parameters............................................................................................................... 76
3.16 The ISKAMP Header Format......................................................................................78
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 .17  Example of a Main Mode Exchange......................................................................... 80
3.18 Example of an Aggressive Mode Exchange............................................................80
3.19 Example of a Quick Mode exchange........................................................................81
4.1 IPSec functional five logical layers..........................................................................84
4.2 Policy deployment architecture............................................................................... 87
4.3 IPSec Policy and Business Management function Layer.................................. 88
4.4 IPSec management function layer...........................................................................90
4.5 IPSec Security services Function Layer................................................................ 90
4.6 IPSec Security Mechanism Function Layer.......................................................... 93
4.7 IPSec Primitive Modules Layer.............................................................................. 94
4.8 IPSec Protocol Handling Function......................................................................... 96
4.9 Location of IPSec Architecture............................................................................... 99
5.1 SA Negotiation............................................................................................................100
5.2 Third Message of the ISAKMP Base Exchange.................................................101
5.3 Fourth Message of the ISAKMP Base Exchange.............................................. 103
5.4 IPSec Example............................................................................................................104
5.5 Flow of specific IPSec SMIB.................................................................................. 106
5.6 Example of IPSec outbound processing.............................................................107
5.7 Schematic of A security Gateway........................................................................107
5.8 Schematic of IPSec VPN Configuration............................................................108
A.1.1 IPv4 datagram........................................................................................................ 116
A.1.2 IPv6 Header Format.............................................................................................. 121
A.4.1 The ISKAMP Header Format............................................................................. 128
A.4.2 Generic Payload Header Format........................................................................131
A.4.3 Security Association Payload Format...............................................................132
A.4.4 Proposal Payload Format......................................................................................133
A.4.5 Transform Payload Format................................................................................. 135
A.4.6 Key Exchange Payload Format...........................................................................136
A.4.7 Identification Payload Format............................................................................137
A.4.8 Certificate Payload Format.................................................................................. 137
A.4.9 Hash Payload Format............................................................................................ 138
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A.4.10 Signature Payload Format............................................................................. 139
A.4.11 Nonce Payload Form at....................................................................................139
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Security Services to Counter Security Threats......................................................... 8
1.2 Typical Threats in Particular Application Environments..................................... 9
4.1 Security Services Provided by AH and ESP............................................................. 91
A2.1 Example of S A ............................................................................................................... 124
A.4.1 Assigned Values for ISAKMP Payloads................................................................. 129
A.4.2 ISAKMP Exchange Type and Assigned Values.................................................... 130
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
XIII
LIST OF ACRONYMS
3DES Triple DES
ABR Area Border Router
ACK Acknowledgment
ACL Access Control List
AD Adminstrative Distance
AH Authentication Header
ARP Advance Research Project Agency
ARPA Address Resolution Protocol
AS Autonomous System Border Router
ASCII American Standard Code For Information Interchange
ASN.l Autonomous System Number
ASBR Abstract Syntax Notation
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
ATT Attached
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
C Customer
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CE Cisco Express Forwarding
CEF Cipher Feedback
CFB Customer Edge
CIDR Classless Inter-Domain Routing
CLNS Connectionless Network Service
CONFED Confederation
CoS Class o f Service
CPE Customer Premises Equipment
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRL Constraint-Based Label Distribution Protocol
CR-LDP Certificate Revocation List
CUG Closed User Group
DER Distinguished Encoding Rules
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Don't Fragment
D-H Diffie-Hellman
DN Distinguished Name
DoD Domain of Interpretation
DOI Department of Defense
DoS Denial of Service
DS Digital Signal
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
EBGP External BGP
ECB Electmic Code Book
EGP Exterior Gateway Protocol
EIGRP Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ES End System
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FEC Forwarding Equivalence Class
FIB Forwarding Information Base
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
HDLC High-Level Data Link Control
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HSRP Hot Standby Router Protocol
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IANA Internet Assigned Number Authority
IBGP Internal BGP
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ID Identifier
IEEE Institute of Electrical And Electronics Engineers
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IG Inside Global
IGP Interior Gateway Protocol
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IL Inside Local
IMP Interface Message Processors
IOS Internetwork Operating System
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec IP Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol Version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6
IPX Internetwork Packet Exchange
IS Intermediate System
ISAKMP Internet Security Association And Key Mangement Protocol
ISDN Intergrated Services Digital Network
IS-IS Intermediate System To Intermediate System
ISO International Organization For Standardization
ISP Internet Service Provider
IV Initialization Vector
KE Key Exchange
LI Level 1
L2 Level 2
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LDP Label Distribution Protocol
LFIB Label Forwarding Information Base
LLC Logical Link Control
LSA Link-State Advertisement
LSDB Link-State Database
LSP Label Switched Path
LSR Label Switch Router
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest 5
MED Multi-Exit Discriminator
MIM Man-In-Middle
MM Main Mode
MOD Modulus
MP-BGP Multiprotocol BGP
MP-IBGP Multiprotocol Internal BGP
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
MSS Maximum Segment Size
MTU Maximum Transfer Unit
NAT Network Address Translation
NBMA Nonbroadcast Multiaccess
NET Network Entiry Title
NH Next Hop
NLRI Network Layer Reachability Information
NSA National Security Agency
NSAP Network Service Access Point
NSSA Not-So-Stubby Area
NTP Network Time Protocol
NVRAM Nonvolatile Random Access Memory
OFB Output Feedback
OG Outside Global
OL Outside Local
OSI Open System Interconnect
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
P Provider
PAT Port Address Translation
PC Portable Computer
PE Provider Edge
PEM Privacy Enhanced Mail
PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy
PHP Penultimate Hop Popping
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standard
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PMTU Path Maximum Transfer Unit Discovery
PoS Packet over Sonet
PPP Point-To-Point Protocol
PRC Partial Route Calculation
PREF Preference
QM Quick Mode
QoS Quality of Service
RA Registration Authority
RD Route Distinguisher
RFC Reequest For Comment
RIP Routing Information Protocol
XVI
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
RIPv2 Routing Information Protocol version 2
RR Route Reflector
RSA Rivest- Shamir-Adleman
RSVP Resource Reservation Protocol
RT Route-Target
SA Security Association
SADB SA Database
SCEP Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol
SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SLA Service-Level Algorithm
SLA Service-Level Agreement
SONET Synchronous Optical Network
SOO Site-of-Orgin
SP Service Provider
SPD Selective Packet Discard
SPF Shortest Path First
SPI Security Parameter Index
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDM Time Division Multiplexing
TE Traffic Engineering
TED Tunnel Endpoint Discovery
TLV Type, Length, And Value
ToS Type of Service
TTL Time-to-Live
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VC Virtual Circuit
VPDN Virtual Private Dialup Network
VPN Virtual Private Network
VPNv4 VPN-Ipv4
VRF Virtual Routing And Network
WAN Wide Areas Network
WWW World Wide Web
XOR Exclusively OR
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
XVII
CHAPTER I: 
1.1 Introduction
In the mid 1960’s [1] in the height of the cold war, the Department of Defense (DoD) in 
the USA wanted a command and control network that could survive a nuclear war. The 
DoD consequently commissioned its research arm- ARPA (Advance Research Project 
Agency)- to invent the technology that could get data to its destination reliably even if 
arbitrary part of the network disappeared without warning as a result of a nuclear attack. 
Traditional telephone technology called circuit switching would not work because it had 
serious drawbacks. In circuit switching, a route for data to get from one place to another 
is set up by using relays to make physical connections among pieces of cable. Therefore, 
if a part of the circuit fails, a new circuit must be set up, which could be quite difficult 
and time consuming depending on the severity of the damage [2].
ARPA used a different kind of technology called packet switching. The idea of 
packet switching network was proposed by Paul Baran [3]. In packet switching, data to 
be sent over the network is divided up into discrete parts called packets. Each packet is 
routed independently from one computer to the next over the network until it reaches its 
final destination.
The first experimental network- called the ARPANET -  went into operation in 
December 1969. It consisted of subnets and host computers. The subnets consisted of 
minicomputers called IMPs (Interface Message Processors) connected by transmission 
lines. This network contained four nodes, one each at UCLA (University of California at 
Los Angeles), UCSB (University of California at Santa Barbara), SRI(Stanford Research 
Institute) and University of Utah. Each node of the network composed of an IMP and
1
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host in the same room, connected by wires. These four sites were chosen because all had 
large ARPA contract; additionally, all four sites had different and completely 
incompatible computers. This experimental network grew rapidly: in July 1970 it grew to 
eight nodes, by March 1971 it expanded to sixteen nodes, in April 1972 it grew to twenty 
three nodes and by September 1972 it consisted of thirty four nodes [1].
In the 1983 TCP/IP protocols were adopted as the only official protocol of the 
ARPANET. During the same year the term Internet came into common usage. The old 
ARPANET was divided into MILNET, the unclassified part of the Defense Data 
Network (DDN), and a new smaller ARPANET. The “Internet” was used to refer to the 
entire network: the MILNET plus the ARPANET [1]. Many regional networks in the 
USA joined up to the Internet. In the mid 1980’s trans-Atlantic fiber optic cables were 
laid and consequently, networks in Europe, the Pacific region and Canada were 
connected to the Internet. Growth of the Internet continued exponentially, and by 1995 
there were multiple backbones, hundreds of regional networks, tens of thousands of Local 
Area Networks (LAN’s), millions of hosts, and tens of millions of users. At the close of 
the twentieth century almost every nation was connected to the Internet.
The nature of the Internet has raised many security concerns. The principal 
concern over the years is the fact that Internet Protocol (IP) packets are inherently 
insecure. It is relative easy to forge IP addresses, modify the contents of IP packets, 
replay old content and inspect the content of packets in transit. Therefore, there is no 
guarantee that the IP datagrams originated from the source it claims to originate from, or 
that they will get to the intended destination, or that the contents have not been modified 
or examined by a third party while they were in transit from the source to the destination.
2
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These security problems have caused many companies to stop using the Internet to 
transmit electronic data. These companies turned to leased lines and private networks. 
The Internet Protocol Security protocol developed by Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) in the late 1990 has addressed most of the IP datagram. The Internet 
Architecture Board (LAB) in 1994 issued a report identifying issues concerning 
security needs of the network infrastructure [4], In response to these issues IPSec has 
been developed.
The purpose of this thesis is to implement the IPSec by using Functional Architecture 
Layers. First, however, it is important to have a clear understanding of the related 
algorithms, technologies, and operational processes. The following chapters will 
cover the concept of security systems, and the operations of IP Security Protocol 
(IPSec) and Internet key exchange (IKE), as well as their associated technologies, in 
depth. These associated technologies should be thoroughly understood in order to 
deploy a robust IPSec security policy and to implement fully operational IPSec 
functions.
IPSec is implemented at the network layer. It protects and authenticates IP packets 
between participating IPSec devices (peers) such as firewalls, routers, clients, and 
other IPSec-compliant products. IPSec is a framework of open standards, which is not 
formally limited to any specific set of algorithms. As such, IPSec allows for newer 
and better algorithms to be implemented without patching the existing standards, and 
it provides data confidentiality, data integrity, and data origin authentication between
3
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participating peers at the IP layer. In the following sections, we will look at the 
definitions o f these security services and describe the technologies associated with 
them.
IPSec provides the capability to secure communications across a LAN, across private 
and public WANs, and across the Internet. In addition, IPSec can play a vital role in 
the routing architecture required for internetworking [5]. For example, routing 
protocols such as OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) should be run on top o f any 
security association (SA) between routers that are defined by IPSec. It is seen that the 
IPSec specification has become quite complex. The numerous documents defining 
IPSec do not provide a framework for its implementation. The various vendors of 
traditional security systems are implementing some of the IPSec functionality and 
security services relying on their own mostly nonstructured functional architecture. 
This nonstructured implementation can only provide some sort of piecemeal 
implementation, and cannot address security demanded by efficient implementation 
o f IPSec. The key to successful IPSec functional architecture is to consider the 
security management as an evolving integrated part of the architecture.
This thesis is organized into five chapters.
First three chapters provide necessary background information for this topic stating 
the problem and thesis contribution. They also provide basic concepts of network 
security threats, TCP/IP overview, and cryptography tools and techniques.
Chapter IV, which is the body of the thesis, provides the design o f the functional 
structures o f IPSec in an integrated form of modular architecture.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Y provides some security session scenarios which will demonstrate the 
execution of the designed IPSec syste in an IPSec environment.
Finally, we conclude this work by summarizing the results, and making suggestions 
for future work in Chapter VI.
5
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1-2 Network Security
1-1.1 Introduction to Network Security:
The Internet is changing the way we work, live, play, and learn. These changes are 
occurring both in the ways that we currently experience (e-commerce, real-time 
information access, e-leaming, expanded communication options, and so forth), and 
in ways we have yet to experience. Imagine a day when your enterprise can make all 
its telephone calls over the Internet for free. Or perhaps on a more personal note, 
consider logging on to a daycare provider’s website to check how your child is doing 
throughout the day. As a society, we are just beginning to unlock the potential of the 
Internet. But with the Internet’s unparalleled growth comes unprecedented exposure 
of personal data, critical enterprise resources, government secrets, and so forth. Every 
day hackers pose an increasing threat to these entities with several different types of 
attacks. These attacks, outlined in the next section, have become both more prolific 
and easier to implement.
There are two primary reasons for this problem. First is the ubiquity of the 
Internet. With millions of devices currently connected to the Internet, and millions 
more on the way, a hacker’s access to vulnerable devices will continue to increase. 
The ubiquity of the Internet has also allowed hackers to share knowledge on a global 
scale. A simple Internet search on the words “hack,” “crack,” or “phreak” yields 
thousands of sites, many of which contain malicious code, or the means with which to 
use that code.
Second is the pervasiveness of easy-to-use operating systems and development 
environments. This factor has reduced the overall ingenuity and knowledge required
6
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by hackers. A truly remarkable hacker can develop easy-to-use applications that can 
be distributed to the masses. Several hacker tools that are available in the public 
domain merely require an IP address or host name and a click of a mouse button to 
execute an attack [6].
1-1.2 Introduction to Security Threats
A threat or security attack is a potential violation of security or an intrusion for 
unauthorized, illegitimate, malicious or fraudulent purposes. These attacks are aimed to 
compromise security. The points o f  attack (or attacking points) can occur at various 
weakness points within a security perimeter, and can be at any level or layer of 
realization, e.g., at the physical system realization level, at the system or network level, at 
the communication protocol level, and so on.
Table 1.1 lists some known attacks and their brief descriptions. These are examples of 
specific threats that a security management system may need to counter. The nature of 
the attacks varies with the circumstances and according to the defined perimeter for the 
security. Threats may be classified by their type (e.g., accidental or intentional, passive 
or active), by their consequences, or by their sources (e.g., users or programs) and objects 
of threats. Our purpose is not to categorize various known (or unknown) threats. This is 
beyond the scope of this study. However, we need to be aware of all potential threats (at 
all conceivable levels of all natures) in order to come up with security services to counter 
them. Typical intentional known threats and the corresponding security services to 
counter them are listed in Table 1.1 The goal of this study is to develop an architecture
7
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that counters the intentional threats by implementing appropriate service(s) for the given
security domain.
THREAT OR 
VIOLATION
(SECURITY
ATTACK)
DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENSES
DEFENSE
(REQUIRED
SECURITY
SERVICE)
Eavesdropping
A passive attack for 
disclosure of information
Interception; leak of information; 
loss of confidentiality; loss of 
anonymity; traffic analysis 
deduction
Confidentiality
Masquerade
Spoofing, a bogus party 
aims to dupe legitimate 
parties into giving up 
sensitive information
Misuse of credentials or security 
parameters; incorrectly executed 
sign-on procedure; false claim of 
origin o f parameters
Authentication
Repudiation
An authorized involved 
party subsequently denies 
the transaction
Denial of origin; denial of 
delivery; denial of submission, 
denial of a specific action
Non-repudiation
Forgery or fraud
A party fabricates 
information and claims it 
came from another party
Fabrication; insertion o f spurious 
information in a network or to a 
file
Data Integrity, 
Access Control, 
Authentication
Non-authorized
access
Attempts to conform to the 
rules of authentication and 
access control to gain 
information in violation to 
the security policy in force
Modifying the files; performing 
actions outside of the security 
profile;
illegal associations
Authentication, 
Access Control
Denial of Service 
& Interruption
Legitimate access to 
secured entities is 
deliberately impeded
A party prevents others from 
performing their functions; 
flooding the network with faked 
error messages; denial of access, 
denial of communication; 
deliberate suppression of a 
particular party
Availability, 
Authentication, 
Access C ontrol, 
Integrity
Trapdoor
A built-in feature that 
allows security policy to be 
violated
Intentional or unintentional 
violation of security services
Firewalling, anti­
virus,
authentication 
access control
Modification of 
Programs 
(Trojan horse, 
viruses, and 
worms)
Software with an invisible 
malicious part, when 
executed, compromises the 
security of the user party
Destruction of the operating 
systems, communication 
software, or user application 
software
Firewalling, anti­
virus program, 
data integrity, 
authentication
Message 
modification, 
data loss & 
corruption
Integrity compromised by 
unauthorized deletion, 
insertion, modification, 
replay or delay
Modification or deletion of 
messages, information, and files; Integrity
Table 1.1: Security Services to Counter Security Threats
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Not given in Table 1.1, are famous security products/solutions, which are designed for 
a particular environment or for a special application. They are considered as custom- 
designed combinations of the above services. Examples of these are:
1. PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) - a widely used authentication and confidentiality 
service.
2. Kerberos - an authentication protocol based on conventional encryption to 
authenticate clients to servers, and vice versa. The Version 5 Kerberos was 
developed within the Internet community.
3. PEM (Privacy Enhancement Mail)- developed specifically as an Internet 
Standard for electronic mail.
For illustration purposes, some typical threats associated with various business
environment are shown in Table 1.2.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS THREATS
Enterprise Network:
Outside prevention (hackers)
Ensure message authenticity 
Protect corporate/individual privacy
Masquerade, data corruption 
Eavesdropping
Banking:
Fraud protection, prevention of data modification
Identify legitimate parties
Identify legitimate transactions
Protect PINs from disclosure
Ensure parties' privacy
Forgery or fraud 
unauthorized access 
repudiation, masquerade 
Eavesdropping
Government:
Protection against unauthorized disclosure or 
manipulation o f information.
Provide electronic signature on documents
Masquerade, unauthorized access, 
eavesdropping, data loss and corruption 
Repudiation
Public Networks:
Restrict access to management & administration functions 
Protect against service interruptions 
Protect users' privacy
Masquerade, unauthorized access 
Service denial 
Eavesdropping
Electronic Commerce:
Ensure the source and integrity of transaction
Protect transaction privacy
Provide electronic signatures on transactions
Masquerade, data loss and corruption
Eavesdropping
Repudiation
Table 1.2: Typical Threats in Particular Application Environments
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1.1.3 Common type of network Attacks
Without security, both public and private networks are susceptible to unauthorized 
monitoring and access. Internal attacks might be a result of minimal or nonexistent 
intranet security; while risks from outside the private network stem from connections to 
the Internet and extranets. Password-based user access controls alone do not protect data 
transmitted across a network.
Without security measures and controls in place, the data might be subjected to an attack.
• Passive attacks, meaning information is monitored,
• Active attacks, meaning the information is altered with intent to corrupt or 
destroy the data or the network itself.
The networks and data are vulnerable to any type of attacks listed in Table 1.1, as 
described in the following bullet items:
• Eavesdropping
In general, the majority of network communications occur in an unsecured or 
“cleartext” format which allows an attacker who has gained access to data paths 
in your network to “listen in” or interpret (read) the traffic. When an attacker is 
eavesdropping on your communications, it is referred to as sniffing or snooping. 
The ability of an eavesdropper to monitor the network is generally the biggest 
security problem that administrators face in an enterprise. Without strong 
encryption services that are based on cryptography, the data can be read by others 
as it traverses the network.
10
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• Data Modification
After an attacker has read the data, the next logical step is to alter it. An attacker 
can modify the data in the packet without the knowledge of the sender or receiver. 
Even if the network does not require confidentiality for all communications, you 
do not want any of messages to be modified in transit. For example, if we are 
exchanging purchase requisitions, we do not want the items, amounts, or billing 
information to be modified.
• Identity Spoofing (IP Address Spoofing)
Most networks and operating systems use the IP address of a computer to identify 
a valid entity. In certain cases, it is possible for an IP address to be falsely 
assumed— identity spoofing. An attacker might also use special programs to 
construct IP packets that appear to originate from valid addresses inside the 
corporate intranet. After gaining access to the network with a valid IP address, the 
attacker can modify, reroute, or delete the data. The attacker can also conduct 
other types of attacks, as described in the following bullet item.
• Password-Based Attacks
A common denominator of most operating system and network security plans is 
password-based access control. This means access rights to a computer and 
network resources are determined by the user name and their passwords.
11
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Older applications do not always protect identity information as it is passed 
through the network for validation. This might allow an eavesdropper to gain 
access to the network by posing as a valid user. When an attacker finds a valid 
user account, the attacker has the same rights as the real user. Therefore, if the 
user has administrator-level rights, the attacker also can create accounts for 
subsequent access at a later time. After gaining access to the network with a valid 
account, an attacker can do any of the following:
■ Obtain lists of valid user and computer names and network 
information.
* Modify server and network configurations, including access 
controls and routing tables.
■ Modify, reroute, or delete any data.
• Denial-of-Service Attack
Unlike a password-based attack, the denial-of-service attack prevents normal use 
of a computer or network by its valid users. After gaining access to the network, 
the attacker can do any of the following:
■ Randomize the attention of the internal IS staff so that they do not 
see the intrusion immediately, which allows the attacker to make 
more attacks during the diversion.
■ Send invalid data to applications or network services, which causes 
abnormal termination or behavior of the applications or services.
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* Flood a computer or the entire network with traffic until a 
shutdown occurs because of the overload.
■ Block traffic, which results in a loss of access to network resources 
by authorized users.
• Man-in-the-Middle Attack
As the name indicates, a man-in-the-middle attack occurs when someone between 
a legitimate user and the person with whom this user is communicating is actively 
monitoring, capturing, and controlling the communication transparently.
For example, the attacker can re-route a data exchange. When computers are 
communicating at low levels of the network layer, the computers might not be 
able to determine with whom they are exchanging data.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are like someone assuming your identity in order to 
read your message. The person on the other end might believe it is you because 
the attacker might be actively replying as you to keep the exchange going and 
gain more information. This attack is capable of the same damage as an 
application-layer attack, described later in this section.
• Com promised-Key Attack
A key is a secret code or number necessary to interpret secured information. 
Although obtaining a key is a difficult and resource-intensive process for an 
attacker, it is possible. After an attacker obtains a key, that key is referred to as a 
compromised key. An attacker uses the compromised key to gain access to a
13
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secured communication without the sender or receiver being aware of the attack. 
With the compromised key, the attacker can decrypt or modify data, and try to use 
the compromised key to compute additional keys, which might allow the attacker 
access to other secured communications.
• Sniffer Attack
A sniffer is an application or device that can read, monitor, and capture network 
data exchanges and read network packets. If the packets are not encrypted, a 
sniffer provides a full view of the data inside the packet. Even encapsulated 
(tunneled) packets can be broken open and read unless they are encrypted and the 
attacker does not have access to the key. Using a sniffer, an attacker can do any of 
the following:
■ Analyze the network and gain information to eventually cause the 
network to crash or to become corrupted.
■ Read the communications.
• Application-Layer Attack
An application-layer attack targets application servers by deliberately causing a 
fault in a server’s operating system or applications. This results in the attacker 
gaining the ability to bypass normal access controls. The attacker takes advantage 
of this situation, gaining control of the application, system, or network, and can 
do any of the following:
■ Read, add, delete, or modify the data or operating system.
14
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■ Introduce a virus program that uses computers and software 
applications to copy viruses throughout your network.
■ Introduce a sniffer program to analyze the network and gain 
information that can eventually be used, to crash or to corrupt 
systems and the network.
■ Abnormally terminate the data applications or operating systems.
* Disable other security controls to enable future attacks.
15
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1.2 TCP / IP Overview
1.2.1 Introduction
The Transport Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite proved to be quite 
robust and was very adaptable to the different networks. This along with the fact that it 
was an open protocol, it was freely available, it was developed independently of any 
specific computer hardware or operating system, and it was simple and easy to implement 
made it very popular. By 1983, TCP/IP was integrated into release 4.2 of Berkeley 
Software Distribution (BSD) UNIX, and the same year, the DoD adopted this protocol 
suite as Military Standard (MIL STD) and it became the standard of the Internet.
Today, TCP/IP continues to be the standard for the Internet.
The fact that this protocol was designed to be independent of any specific physical 
network hardware has allowed it to be integrated into many different kinds of networks. 
TCP/IP is currently integrated into Ethernets, token ring, dialup networks and just about 
every other type of physical transmission medium, and virtually all modem operating 
systems.
1.2.2 TCP/ IP Protocol architecture
Networking protocols are normally developed in layers, with each layer responsible for a 
different facet of the communication [7]. The TCP/IP protocol suite consists of four 
layers. Each layer has distinct functions and consists of a consists of a combination of 
different protocols as shown in Figure 1.1. The functionalities of the layers are discussed 
below.
16
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Figure 1.1: Protocols at the four layers of the TCP/IP protocol suite.
• Data-link Layer
The data-link layer is also called the data link or network access layer. It is the lowest 
layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack. Example of data-link layers are Ethernet, Token Ring 
and ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode). For information on Ethernet refer to [8], for 
information on Token Ring see[9], and for further detail on ATM see [10], [11] and [12]. 
The protocols in data-link layer provide means for the system to deliver data to other 
devices on the network. These protocols are concerned with details such as the packet 
structure and addressing scheme of the underlining network. Two of the protocols in this 
layer are ARP (Address Resolution Protocol), which maps IP addresses to Ethernet 
addresses; and RARP (Reverse Address Resolution Protocol), which maps Ethernet 
address to IP address. See [13] and [14] for further information on these protocols.
When the data-link layer receives a packet from the network layer the layer, above 
it, encapsulates the packet with the appropriate header then sends it via the physical
17
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network to the specified device. The reverse occurs when a packet arrives from the 
physical network to the data link layer: the layer removes the data-link header then sends 
the packet up to the network layer for processing. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
user data
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Figure 1.2: Encapsulation and de-capsulation of data as it goes down and up the protocol stack, 
respectively.
• Network Layer
The network layer is also called the internet layer. This layer is responsible for the 
routing of packets from the source host to the destination host. The network layer consists 
of three protocols: Internet Control Protocol (ICMP), Internet Group Management 
Protocol (IGMP) and Internet Protocol (IP).
The official specification of ICMP is outlined in [15]. ICMP is the protocol that is 
used to communicate error conditions that occurred during the transmission of IP packets. 
The ICMP message is usually encapsulated in the IP datagram. Another important role of
18
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ICMP is the debug of network connectivity problems. The popular debugging tools are 
ping and traceroute using this protocol.
IGMP is the protocol that is used by hosts and routers to ascertain information about 
the hosts in multicast groups; i.e., groups of hosts to which IP datagrams are to be sent 
simultaneously. As is the case with ICMP, IGMP messages are encapsulated in IP 
datagrams. For further detail on IGMP refer to [16] which contains the original 
specification of IGMP.
IP is the protocol that holds the whole TCP/IP protocol suite architecture together. 
The data of the protocols in all of the layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack, except the data- 
link layer, are transmitted as IP datagrams. IP allows hosts to inject packets into the data- 
link layer, which eventually puts them on the physical network and has them travel on 
potentially different networks to their final destination. IP offers a connectionless service. 
In connectionless services, each message or datagram carries the full destination address, 
and is routed independently of the other datagrams. With connectionless services, it is 
possible for the datagrams to arrive at their destination in different order that they were 
sent. This is not possible with connection-oriented services, since the latter is like a 
telephone system which establishes a connection or a path from the host to the destination 
uses the path to send data, and then releases the connection after the data transmission is 
completed.
There are two versions of IP that are available for use with the TCP/IP protocol, IPv4 and 
IPv6, as discussed in Appendix Al.
19
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• Transport Layer
The layer above the network layer in the TCP/IP protocol stack is the transport layer. 
This layer provides a flow of data between two hosts, for the application layer above.
Two protocols are implemented at the transport layer, 1) TCP (Transport Control 
Protocol) and 2) UDP (User Datagram Protocol). TCP is a reliable connection-oriented 
protocol that allows byte streams from a host to be delivered without error to any other 
hosts on networks that are reachable. The TCP protocol also breaks up received packets, 
re-assembles packet fragments it received from the network layer, and perform flow 
control to ensure that a fast hosts does not overwhelm a slower host with more packets 
that it can handle. See [17] for further detail On this protocol.
The UDP, unlike TCP, offers an unreliable and connectionless service. It does not 
perform any error checking or flow control; it simply sends datagrams from one host to 
another and does not provide any guarantee that a datagram will get to its destination. 
There is much less overhead involved in processing UDP datagrams compared to TCP 
packets. Consequently, the throughput of UDP datagrams is usually greater than that of 
TCP. UDP protocol is usually use by applications for which prompt delivery is more 
important than accurate delivery; such as in the transmission of speech or video. See [18] 
for outline of the original specification of UDP.
20
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• Application Layer
The top of the TCP/IP protocol stack is the application layer. This layer includes all 
processes that use the transport layer protocols to deliver data. Application layer 
protocols usually provide services to the users of the system. There are many application 
protocols. The ones that just about all TCP/IP implementation provides include:
-Telnet: The Network Terminal Protocol, which provides remote login.
-FTP: File Transfer Protocol, which is used for file transfer to or from remote hosts.
- SMTP: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, which delivers electronic mail.
- SNMP: Simple Network Management Protocol, which is used for monitoring network 
segments.
- DNS: Domain Name Service, which is used for mapping host names onto their IP 
addresses.
- HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol, which is used for fetching web pages on the World 
Wide Web.
21
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1.3 Cryptographic tools and Techniques
1.3.1 Introduction
There is no single cryptographic tool. There are various techniques for encrypting 
messages, for securely exchanging keys, for maintaining the integrity of messages, and 
for guaranteeing authenticity of a message. All of these techniques combined to provide 
the services necessary to keep secrets in an increasingly public world.
There is really no such thing as absolute security, but for every secret there is a threat, 
and analysis must be made to determine the viability of that threat and the damage that 
can be done if they are acted upon. Generally, the strength of a cryptosystem is measured 
by its complexity. If the complexity of a particular crypto-system is 232 then it is assumed 
that 232 separate operations are required to break it. That is a considerable number of 
operations, but if each operation can be performed by a modem computer in hundredths 
or thousandths of a second, the system might not be secure enough for the secret it is 
protecting. Because of this the term computationally secure is used to express the security 
of a modem cryptosystem.
1.3.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
A good portion of public key cryptography relies upon a foundation of one-way 
functions and trapdoors. A one-way function is something that is easy to compute in one 
direction but difficult, bordering on impossible, to compute in the other direction. A 
trapdoor is a way to sneak back, in effect a way to cheat and return using a secret 
passage.
22
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For a one-way function to be useful in cryptography it must exhibit its one way- 
ness with any input. For example, in a finite field it is easy to compute the product of 
numbers but difficult to factor that product. Another number example is the Discrete 
Logarithm Problem: with a larger prime, p, and a base generator, g, for a particular value 
y, find x where
g x = y mod p
Modular exponentiation is easy, but doing a discrete logarithm to recover the exponent is 
hard. For any class of numbers: odd numbers, palindromic numbers, numbers divisible by 
47 - the problem of solving the discrete logarithm is still very hard; see [19].
1.3.3 Encryption Concepts and Algorithms
1) Encryption Concepts
Unencrypted message is referred to as “plaintext”. The process of camouflaging a 
message in such a way as to conceal its content is known as encryption. An encrypted 
message is referred to as “ciphertext”. The process of converting ciphertext back into 
plaintext is known as decryption.
2) Cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm, also called a cipher, is the mathematical function used for 
encryption and decryption. For better security, quality control and standardization, 
modem cryptography incorporates the concept of a key. This key can take many values 
(usually denoted in binary bits), and is analogous to the combination of a lock. Although 
the concept of a combination lock is well known, it is often difficult to open a 
combination lock without knowing the combination. In addition, the more numbers in a
23
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given combination, the more time consuming it will be to guess the combination. The 
same is true for cryptographic keys; hence the more bits in a key the less susceptible a 
key is to being compromised. Therefore, the security robustness in modem day ciphers is 
based on the key rather than the details of the cipher known as encryption algorithm. This 
doesn’t matter if an eavesdropper knows the algorithm; if the particular key is not 
revealed, the message cannot be read by anyone.
3) Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the security service that protects data and the external characteristics of 
communication from unauthorized disclosure by concealing source and destination 
addresses, message length or frequency of communication. With confidentiality, the 
intended recipients know what was being sent but unintended parties cannot determine 
what was sent. Encryption algorithms can be used to provide confidentiality.
There are two general types of key-based algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric, 
o Symmetric Algorithms
In symmetric algorithms, the encryption key can be calculated from the 
decryption key and vice versa. In this case, encryption and decryption use the 
same mathematical functions, and the encryption key and the decryption key are 
identical. Symmetric algorithms, also known as secret-key algorithms, require that 
the sender and receiver agree on a key before they can transmit and receive 
information securely, as it demonstrated in Figure 1.3.
24
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Figure 1.3: Schematic Example for Symmetric Cryptography
The security of a symmetric algorithm lies in the key; disclosing the key implies 
that anyone could encrypt and decrypt the messages. Therefore, it is mandatory 
that the key remain secret.
Symmetric algorithms are further categorized into stream and block ciphers. 
Block ciphers operate on one block of data (usually in 64-bit block size) at a time. 
Stream ciphers conversely operate on data one bit (or one byte) at a time. In either 
case, they are ideal for bulk encryption. As block ciphers are used only in IPSec, 
stream ciphers are beyond the scope of this study.
Cipher mode refers to a set of techniques used to apply a block cipher to a data 
stream. Four basic modes are used:
- Electronic code book (ECB)
- Cipher block chaining (CBC)
- Cipher feedback (CFB)
- Output feedback (OFB)
An example of a symmetric block in CBC mode is the Data Encryption Standard 
(DES). DES encrypts data in 64-bit blocks and the same algorithm and key are 
used for both encryption and decryption. The key length is 56 bits. The key can be
25
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any 56-bit number and can be altered any time. DES breaks a massage into 64-bit 
blocks, XORs the first block with the Initialization Vector (IV), and encrypts it 
with the 56-bit key. The result is a 64-bit block of cipher text that is further 
XORed with the next 64-bit block. This process is repeated until the entire 
message has been encrypted.
There is a more secure variant of DES. called “3DES”. In 3DES, pronounced 
“Triple-DES” the DES algorithm is applied 3 times to each 64-bit plaintext block, 
using a different 56-bit key each time. A typical approach uses two different 56- 
bit keys, K1 and K2, yielding a length of 112 bits, with K1 being reused for the 
final (third) encrypt. Other applications use three different 56-bit keys, K l, K2, 
and K3, and K3, yielding a total key length of 168 bits. Using the same key in all 
three steps will yield the same result as encrypting with conventional DES. Due to 
the second step being a decryption operation [20],
Over the years, a number of symmetric cryptosystems have been proposed as 
possible replacement for DES. Some of these cryptosystems will be introduced 
below.
• Blowfish: Blowfish was developed by Bruce Schneier [21]. It uses a key 
of variable length: from 32 to 448 bits to encrypt blocks of 64-bit plaintext 
into blocks of 64-bit ciphertext. Blowfish has a simple structure which 
makes it easy to implement. Currently, Blowfish is one of the fastest 
encryption systems. The variable length key allows for varied degree of
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security. It is believed that Blowfish is very secure, particularly when 
longer keys are used.
• CAST-128: CAST was developed by Carlisle Adams and Stafford 
Tavares [22]. It uses a key that varies between 40 to 128 bits in length, in 
8-bits increments; and produces 64-bit blocks ciphertext from blocks of 
64-bit plaintext. The CAST algorithm involves 16 rounds of computations 
which are quite complex. This algorithm has received widespread review 
and it is believed to be quite safe.
• International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA): IDEA was 
developed by Xuejia Lai and James Massey at the Swiss Institute of 
Technology (ETH in Zurich). The original specification and later 
modifications are outlined in [23] and [24] respectively. IDEA uses a 128- 
bit key and encrypts plaintext in blocks of 64 bits and output 64-bits 
blocks ciphertext. IDEA enciphering algorithm has received a fair bit of 
attention and it is believed that to be quite secure for a number of years.
• RC2: RC2 was developed by Ronald Rivest [25]. It is designed to be 
easily implemented on 16-bit microprocessors. The algorithm uses a key 
of variable length: from 8 bytes to 128 bytes and enciphers block of 64-bit 
plaintext to output blocks of ciphertext of 64 bits, inlength.
• RC5: RC5 was developed by Ronald Rivest [26]; a later description is 
given in [27], RC5, like DES, is suitable for both hardware and software 
implementation. It is adaptable to processor of different word length. The 
number of bits in the processor’s word is one of the inputs to the RC5
27
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algorithm. RC5 algorithm also has variable number of rounds, which 
allows tradeoff between higher speed and higher security. The algorithm 
uses a variable length key to encrypt plaintext blocks of 32, 64 or 128 bits 
and output blocks of ciphertext of corresponding length. RC5 has a low 
memory requirement which therefore, makes it suitable to be used in 
applications such as smart cards that have limited memory, 
o Asymmetric Algorithms
Asymmetric algorithms are designed so that the key used for encryption is 
different from the key used for decryption as it is shown schematically in 
Figurel.4.
In addition, the decryption key cannot be derived from the encryption key. These 
algorithms are referred to as public-key algorithms, because the encryption key is 
made public. In other words, anyone can use the encryption key (public key) to 
encrypt a message, but only a specific recipient with the corresponding decryption 
key (private key) can decrypt the message. In other instances the message can be
o
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Figure 1.4: Schematic Example for Asymmetric Cryptography
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encrypted with private key and decrypted with the public key. This is typically 
used in digital signatures.
An example of a public key cipher is the RSA algorithm developed by Ron 
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. The public and private keys are 
functions of a pair of large prime numbers. The security of this approach is based 
on the fact that it can be relatively easy to multiply these large prime numbers 
together but extremely difficult to factor the resulting product. In other words, 
anyone attempting to recover the text plain from the cipher text and the public key 
will have to go through the knotty task of guessing Hie decryption (private) key by 
factoring the resulting product of two large prime numbers. RSA uses a key 
length of 512 bits, 768 bits, 1024 bits, or longer. A longer key length offers 
stronger security, but also uses up more CPU processing cycles. This is due to the 
fact that the mathematical computations in the RSA algorithm are much more 
complicated than the DES algorithm [28]. As a result, in hardware, RSA is about 
1000 times slower than DES, and in software, DES is up to 100 times faster than 
RSA. These numbers may change slightly as technology advances, however, RSA 
will never approach the speed of symmetric algorithms, which makes it an 
unlikely candidate for bulk data encryption [29].
Public-key algorithms such as RSA are rarely used for data confidentiality 
(encryption) because of the performance constraints mentioned earlier. Instead, 
they are most often used in applications involving authentication via digital 
signatures and key management. In real life, public key algorithms are not
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surrogates for symmetric algorithms. They are typically used to encrypt keys 
instead of messages.
1.3.4 Hashing Concepts and Algorithms
1) Hashing Concepts
A one-way hash function is a mathematical function that is easy to compute in the 
forward direction, but computationally infeasible to reverse. An input message runs 
through the mathematical function (the hash function) and results in a string of output bits 
called a hash (or a message digest). The process is irreversible, that is, the input cannot be 
derived from the output. It is analogous to a coffee grinder. Imagine the message is the 
coffee beans and the output hash is the resulting ground coffee. It is quite impossible to 
take the ground coffee and recreate the original coffee beans. In addition, a hash function 
takes a message of arbitrary length and produces a fixed-length output [30],
It is important to implement keyed hashing because only performing a one way hash on 
some data does not provide any authentication. A hash function alone is like a checksum. 
Anybody can modify the data and just run the hash algorithm over the modified data. A 
keyed hash function is a message authentication code (MAC), which, in other words, is a 
one-way hash function encrypted using private key. A MAC is generated through hashing 
a shared privet key along with message.
The concept is the same as hash functions, except now only the holder of the secret key 
can verify the hash value. Figure 1.5 illustrates how keyed hashing works [31].
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Figure 1.5: A keyed hashing function (MAC)
Keyed hashing can be used to generate a hash (MAC) on each IP packet in an IP 
data stream. These hashes then become part of the IP packet and are used to verify the 
integrity of the IP packet when it is received. The recipient runs the same hash (plus 
shared secret key) on each received IP packet and compares it with the inserted hash 
value. If nothing in the packet has been modified in transit the results are the same and 
the integrity of the IP packet remains intact. Common keyed hash functions include:
- Message Digest 5 (MD5) is a one-way hash that combines a shared secret and 
the message, to produce a hash. MD5 processes the input text in 512-bit blocks, 
divided into 16 x 32-bit subblocks. The output is a set of 4 x 32-bit blocks, 
concatenated to form a single 128-bit hash value.
- Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is similar to MD5 but the algorithm output is a 
set of 5x 32-bit blocks, concatenated to form a single 160-bit hash value.
Note that all message authentications in IPSec use hashed MAC (HMAC) described in 
[32] so MD5 becomes HMAC-MD5 and SHA becomes HMAC-SHA. HMAC is a
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variant that provides an additional level of hashing making it cryptographically stronger 
than principal hashing function.
2) Integrity Service
Integrity is a security service that ensures that any modifications to data are detectable. 
There are two types of integrity in a TCP/IP environment: connectionless and partial 
sequence integrity. Connectionless integrity is a service that detects the modification of 
individual IP packets without regard to the ordering of the packet in a traffic stream. 
Partial sequence integrity is referred to as antireplay integrity, and it detects arrival of 
duplicate IP packets. With integrity, data is transmitted from source to destination 
without undetected change. Hashing algorithms can be used to provide integrity. 
Although authentication and integrity services are often mentioned separately, in practice 
they are closely related, and almost always offered together.
3) Key Exchanges
Symmetric algorithms and keyed hashing both require a shared key. The security of the 
encryption and authentication techniques can be completely undermined by an insecure 
key exchange. With symmetric encryption, the data encryption key is always present and 
remains fixed. Any intruder who compromises the encryption key can decrypt messages 
encrypted with it. A common cryptographic technique is to encrypt each individual 
conversation with a separate key. This is referred to as a session key since it is used for 
only one particular communication and destroyed when it is no longer needed. As such, 
the risk of compromising the session (encryption) key is reduced significantly. In the 
following section, we look at how the Diffie- Heilman key exchange algorithm can be 
used to ensure the secure exchange of keys.
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o Diffie- Heilman key exchange
Diffie- Heilman was the first public key algorithm developed [33], It is secure 
because of the complexity of calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field, as 
compared with the ease of calculating modular exponentiation in the same field. 
Diffie- Heilman can be used to distribute a shared secret key between parties in a 
key exchange across an insecure communication channel such as the Internet.
All participants in a Diffie- Heilman exchange must first choose a group. This 
group defines the prime p  and the generator (primitive) g to be used. The Diffie- 
Hellman exchange comprises two parts. In part 1 each side, Alice and Bob, choose
a random number (which becomes their private key) and does exponentiation to
produce a public value.
- Alice: public-value-A = ga MOD p (where a is the random number chosen 
by Alice).
- Bob: public-value-B = gb MOD p (where b is the random number chosen 
by Bob).
In part 2, Alice and Bob exchange their public values. In other words, Alice 
provides public-value-A to Bob, and Bob provides public-value B to Alice. 
Each side then does an exponentiation again, this time using the other party’s 
public value as the generator, which creates the shared secret key, Z;
- Alice: (public-value-B)a MOD p= gab MOD p  = Z
- Bob: (public-value-A)b MOD p  = gab MOD p  = Z
Once Alice and Bob know the shared secret key Z, they can use it to protect 
their communications with any conventional secret-key algorithms. Anyone
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who knows p  or g will not be able to calculate the shared secret value Z easily 
because it is very complicated to compute a discrete logarithm to recover the 
secret exponents (private keys) Alice and Bob used.
One of the inadequacies with key exchange systems is that the same session 
key is distributed to numerous sessions. If this key is leaked, it can be used to 
deciypt the earlier encrypted traffic. Diffle-Hellman can be used to achieve 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), which eliminates the need for using long-life 
session keys. With PFS, a separate Diffie-Hellman session key (secret key) is 
generated for each session. If any of these keys are recovered, they will only 
provide access to that specific session’s information. The remaining keys that 
are used to encrypt other sessions are not compromised.
Nevertheless, the Diffie-Hellman exchange still has some limitations. 
Alice and Bob can use this algorithm to generate and distribute a shared secret 
key, however, it cannot be used to encrypt and deciypt messages. Another 
drawback of the Diffie-Hellman exchange is that Alice and Bob have no way 
to verify that they are talking to each other, so the exchange can be subject to 
a man-in-the middle attacks. In other words, Diffie-Hellman provides for 
confidentiality but not for authentication. In this case, authentication can be 
achieved via the use of digital signatures in the Diffie-Hellman message 
exchanges.
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1.3.5 Authentication Mechanisms
1) Introduction
Data origin authentication is a security service that verifies the identity of the claimed 
source of data. This service is usually bundled with connection-less integrity service. 
With data-origin authentication, we have to ensure that the data received is the same as 
the data that was sent and that the claimed sender is, in fact, the actual sender. 
Mechanisms such as the exchanges of digital certificates can be use to provide data origin 
authentication.
Confidentiality is mandatory to protect a secret. Without authentication, there is no way 
of validating and identifying the person with whom you share the secret as who he or she 
claims to be. In the following sections, we will examine additional authentication 
mechanisms that can help us identify and validate a sender [36].
2) Digital signatures
A digital signature is an encrypted message digest that is appended to a document. It is 
used to validate the identity of the sender and the integrity of the document. In practical 
implementations, digital signatures are created by combining hash functions with public- 
key algorithms. Because the entire document must be known before signature generation, 
HMAC rather than digital signatures are used to provide the message integrity of an 
ongoing data stream.
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Instead of signing (encrypting) a document, Alice signs (encrypts) the hash of the 
document to produce the digital signature and appends it to the original document. Figure 
1.6 shows an example of how a digital signature is created.
Message
One-Way Hash 
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(MD5.SHA1J
Hash of message |
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Hash Is encrypted 
with the sender's 
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t
Digital Signature is an 
encrypted hash
Figure 1.6: digital signature generation.
Digital signatures require the exchange of public keys beforehand. This exchange of 
public keys is again susceptible to man-in the middle-attack because during the exchange 
process, there is no way to guarantee that the public keys, which Alice and Bob have 
received from each other, are genuine. Some imposter (man-in-the middle) can substitute 
Alice’s public key with his own fabricated public key, therefore, tricking Alice into 
believing that the public key she has received is actually from Bob. In the next section, 
we will look at how digital certificates can be used to thwart this kind of attack [34],
3) Digital certificates
A digital certificate (also commonly referred as public-key certificate) is someone’s 
public key, signed and verified by another trustworthy party. Certificates are used to foil
36
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attempts to substitute one’s key for another. Typically, a digital certificate uses the X.509 
standard format [35].
4) Digital envelopes
Digital signature and digital certificate provide proof of identity but they do not provide 
for privacy. To incorporate confidentiality, we put the signed document into an envelope 
and encrypt the envelope. Typically, the envelope contains encrypted content and 
encrypted content-encryption keys for the recipient. The combination of encrypted 
content and encrypted content encryption keys for a recipient is referred as a digital 
envelope (encrypted message) for that recipient. The process by which enveloped data is 
constructed by the sender involves the following steps:
1) A content-encryption key for a particular content-encryption (symmetric) 
algorithm is generated at random.
2) The content is encrypted with the content-encryption key.
3) The content-encryption key is encrypted with the recipient’s public key. 
The encrypted message and encrypted key are represented together according to the 
syntax of the public key cryptography standard#7 (PKCS #7) [35]. PKCS #7 is a 
general syntax for data that may be encrypted or signed, such as digital signatures 
or digital envelopes. The syntax is recursive, so that envelopes can be nested. 
Digital envelopes are used during CA (Certificate Authority) transactions to ensure 
the secure distribution of the certificates (PKCS#7 wrapped) to the users [35]. At 
the receiving end, the recipient opens the envelope by decrypting the encrypted 
content-encryption keys with the recipient’s private key and decrypting the 
encrypted content with the recovered content-encryption key.
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CHAPTER II: INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY (IPSEC) ARCHITECTURE:
2.1 Introduction:
IPSec is a framework of open standards developed by IETF [36]. It identifies a set of 
methods that intend to protect network traffic at the IP or network layer. It is a mandatory 
component of IP Version 6, (IPv6) and an optional one in IP Version 4, (IPv4).
IP packets have no inherent security. It is relatively easy to forge the addresses of IP 
packets, modify the contents of IP packets, replay old packets, and inspect the contents of 
IP packets in transit. Therefore, there is no guarantee that IP datagrams received are:
(1) from the claimed sender (the source address in the IP header);
(2) that they contain the original data that the sender placed in them; or
(3) that the original data was not inspected by a third party while the packet was being 
sent from source to destination. IPSec' is a method of protecting IP datagrams. This 
protection takes the form of data content confidentiality, data origin authentication, 
connectionless data integrity authentication, anti-replay protection, and limited traffic 
flow confidentiality.
IPSec can be used in three types of scenarios. The first one is protection of one or more 
data communications between two hosts. The second one is protection of data 
communication between two security gateways which connect two networks. The third 
one is protection of data between a security gateway and a host such as remote login. 
These three scenarios can take place across a public network such as the Internet, or 
within a LAN. In either case, IPSec content can not be observed, in ESP protocol, or 
modified, in AH protocol, by a third party. This provides a transparent service for 
building applications that are unaware of the existence of IPSec in the Network Layer.
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Consequently, the application development process is simplified by not integrating any 
security mechanism for transport service purposes.
IPSec provides specific security services at the IP layer. It enables a host or a 
security gateway to select one or more specific security protocol(s), such as AH and ESP, 
encryption and authentication algorithm(s), such as DES, RSA, and cryptographic keys. 
The set of security services that IPSec can provide includes are listed below for quick 
reference:
- Confidentiality(Encryption)
Confidentiality is “the property of communicating such that the intended recipients know 
exactly what was being sent but unintended parties can not determine what was sent”.
- Data Origin Authentication
Data Origin Authentication is “knowing that the data received is the same as the data that 
was sent and that the claimed sender is in fact the actual sender”.
- Connectionless Integrity
Connectionless integrity (for protocols such as UDP) is “the property of ensuring that the 
data is transmitted from source to destination without undetected alteration”. The 
integrity check is done on a per-packet basis. This is in contrast to connection integrity, 
where the integrity check is done on a stream of packets.
- Access Control:
Access control is the ability to limit and control the access to a host system and 
application via communications links. In order to achieve this control, each entity 
(a user or a program) trying to gain access must first be identified or authenticated, and 
then authorized, based on access rights assigned to it.
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- Rejection of Replayed Packets:
Rejection of replayed Packets is the ability to detect and reject any replayed packets that 
can be saved by an attacker.
All of these services are implemented in the IP layer as shown in Figure 2.1.
Encryption is done 
in (Ms layer I C M P
TCP
Network I n t e r f a c e  L a y e r
IP Layer
Figure 2.1 IPSec Encryption not evident in applications
Therefore, all other higher layer protocols such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP can utilize 
IPSec without knowing it even exists. This provides an outstanding feature for software 
developers because they do not need to implement any security mechanisms in their 
software for transport purposes.
2.2 IPSec Implementation in TCP/IP Stack
There are three ways to implement IPSec within the TCP/IP protocol stack [5]:
A) Above the IP Layer - In this kind of implementation, source code of the IP layer 
m ust be available in  order to m odify it. In  addition, the logical interface betw een 
IP and TCP layers must be implemented.
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B) Within the IP Layer - In this kind of implementation, source code of the IP layer 
must be available so that it can be modified to integrate the functionality of IPSec 
protocol.
C) Below the IP layer - In this method, the implementation is started from scratch 
and it does not need the TCP/IP source code. However, certain TCP/IP functions 
must be re-implemented such as dealing with fragmentation and reassembly of 
fragmented packets.
2.3 The IPSec Roadmap
The IPSec protocols include AH, ESP, IKE, ISAKMP/Oakley, and transforms. In order 
to understand, implement, and use IPSec, it is necessary to understand the relationship 
among these components. The IPSec roadmap and related documents define how various 
components of IPSec interact with each other. This is shown in Figure 2.2, and explained 
as follows.
AH
Encr^ptktn Algorithm Authentication Algorithm
Key M tM gcnm t
Figure 2.2 IPSec Roadmap (this figure has been reproduced from the draft with permission of the authors)
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Architecture: Covers the general concepts, security requirements, definitions, and 
mechanisms defining IPSec technology.
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): Covers the packet format and general issues 
related to the use of the ESP for packet encryption and, optionally, authentication. 
Authentication Header (AH): Covers the packet format and general issues related to the 
use of AH for packet authentication.
Encryption Algorithm: A set of documents that describe how various encryption 
algorithms are used for ESP.
Authentication Algorithm: A set of documents that describe how various authentication 
algorithms are used for AH and for the authentication option of ESP.
Key Management: Documents that describe key management schemes.
Domain of Interpretation (DOI): Contains values needed for the other documents to 
relate to each other. These include identifiers for approved encryption and authentication 
algorithms, as well as operational parameters such as key lifetime [8].
2.4 How IPSec Works
IPSec is designed to provide high quality, interoperable cryptographic - based security for 
IPv4 and IPv6 datagrams. IPSec achieves these objectives by use of two traffic security 
protocols Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) and 
through the use of cryptographic key management procedures and protocols such as 
Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE).
The IP AH protocol provides data origin authentication, connectionless integrity and 
an optional anti-replay service.
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The IP ESP protocol provides data confidentiality, limited traffic-flow confidentiality, 
connectionless integrity, data-origin authentication and anti-replay service. There are two 
modes of operation of both AH and ESP: transport mode and tunnel mode. AH and ESP 
can be applied, in the desired mode alone or in combination with each other. The Internet 
Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate the choices of the cryptographic 
algorithms to be utilized by AH and ESP, and put in place the necessary cryptographic 
keys that the algorithms require. AH, ESP and IKE protocols will be discussed in more 
detail in later sections.
The protocols that IPSec uses are designed to be algorithm independent. The choice 
of algorithms is specified in the Security Policy Database (SPDB)*. The possible choices 
of algorithms that are available are dependent on the IPSec implementation; however, a 
standard set of default algorithms are specified by IPSec to ensure interoperability in the 
global Internet.
IPSec allows the user or administrator of a system or a network to control the 
granularity at which the security service is offered. For example an organization’s policy 
might specified that data traffic that originated from certain subnet(s) should be protected 
with both AH and ESP and that the encryption should be done with triple-DES with three 
different keys; whereas, the policy might specified that data traffic from another site 
should be protected with only ESP and that these traffic should be afforded encryption 
with DES1. IPSec is able to differentiate between the security service it offers to different 
data traffic by the us of Security Association (SA).
* In the proposed architecture used in this thesis, we refer to the required database as Security Management 
Information Base (SMIB), see chapter IV. 
t See “IPSec Policy and Business Management Layer,” Section 4.2
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2.5 IPSec Modes
IPSec sessions can be implemented in two different modes: Transport and tunnel mode 
IPSec in the transport mode is used to establish an end-to-end secure communication 
channel between the source and destination hosts. All packets are secure once they leave 
the source host, until they reach the destination host as shown in Figure 2.3. Generally, 
this mode is used within LANs.
End -  to  End Secure Communication Channel-
S en d in g
H o st
R eceiv ing
H ost
Server
Figure 2.3: IPSec in Transport Mode
In the tunnel mode shown in Figure 2.4, IP packets are protected only between this two
defined tunnel points or security gateways.
Gateway -  Gateway 
Unsecure Channel Secure Channel Unsecure Channel
The Internet 
Inter anet
Figure 2.4: IPSec Tunnel Mode
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When packets are transmitted between the client and the security gateway, they are 
sent in an unprotected format until they reach the initial gateway. Then protection is 
applied and the packets are sent to the receiving network security gateway, where they 
are decrypted and forwarded in clear text to the destination host.
2.6 Security Association
2.6.1 Security Association (SA) Concept
Before any IPSec traffic is exchanged between a source and destination host, 
both parties must establish their security parameters through a handshake that 
determines several security parameters such as encryption algorithm, 
authentication algorithm, encryption keys, and the chosen protocol (AH or ESP). 
The IPSec protocol uses the Security Association (SA) mechanism to provide 
groundwork to manage these security parameters. Both AH and ESP IPSec 
protocols need an established SA before any communication can take place. 
Thus, SA is a unidirectional communication that identifies the security 
parameters. To protect a distinctive bi-directional communication using AH or 
ESP protocol, two SAs are required, one in each direction [37]. If both AH and 
ESP protocols are used simultaneously, two or more SAs are needed. This is 
called an SA bundle. Each SA is uniquely identified by the following three 
parameters [37]:
a) The packet destination address
b) The IPSec protocols, either AH or ESP
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c) A Security Parameter Index (SPI) which is chosen by the receiver and is 
transmitted in a clear text.
The IPSec protocol stack uses a Security Association Database (SADB) to store 
all active SAs. This database contains all the parameters pertaining to each SA. 
Sender and receiver hosts consult the SADB for every received or sent packet to 
determine how to deal with them. The SA, or the contract between the sender and 
receiver hosts, contains fields that are needed by both parties to process every 
incoming and outgoing IP packet. Some fields are used for outbound processing, 
some for inbound processing, and some for both, depending on usage of the field 
[37] The fields for the SA is given in Appendix [A2].
2.6.2 Security Databases
There are at least two databases that are necessary for the processing of IPSec traffic: 
Security Policy Database (SPDB) and Security Association Databases (SADB). SPDB 
specifies the policies that are to be applied to the traffic that is destined to, or originated 
from a given host or network. On the other hand, SADB contains the active SA 
parameters. For both SPDB and SADB, separate inbound and outbound databases are 
required. The objects stored in these database are summarized in Appendix A3.
Each entry in the SPDB consists of one or more selectors, an indication of 
whether the packets that match the selectors) in the entry should be discarded, be 
subject to IPSec processing or not be subject to IPSec processing. If the packets are to 
be subjected to IPSec processing, the entry also contains a pointer to a Security
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Association (SA) specification which details the IPSec protocols, modes and 
algorithms to be applied to the packets matching this policy entry.
The first entry with selector(s) matching that/those corresponding to the traffic 
under consideration will be applied. If no matching entry is found, the packets for the 
traffic under consideration will be discarded. The entries in the SPDB should 
therefore be ordered according to the desired preference of application.
The entries in the SPDB determine the granularity with which the traffic is 
processed. For example, the policies could specify that IPSec service corresponding 
to a given SA or SA bundle should be applied to all traffic to or from any source or 
destination; or, the policy could specify the application of different SAs or SA 
bundles based on specifed selectors. The SPDB therefore plays a very important role 
in the control of the flow of all traffic through an IPSec system.
Separate SADB are kept for inbound and outbound IPSec processing for inbound 
or outbound traffic, the respective SADB is searched for selectors matching the SPI, 
the source or destination address and IPSec protocol, extracted from the packet 
header. If a matching entry is found, the parameter for this SA are compared with the 
appropriate fields in the AH or ESP headers. If the header fields correspond with the 
SA parameters in the database, the packet is processed. However, if there are any 
discrepancies, the packet is discarded. If no SA entry matches the selectors, the 
packet is discarded if it is an inbound packet. If the packet however is outbound, a 
new SA or SA bundle will be created and entered in the outbound SADB.
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A SA lifetime has two kind of limit: a soft limit and a hard limit. When the soft 
limit is reached, the communicating peers must re-negotiate a new SA to replace the 
existing one. However, the existing SA is not delected form the database until the 
hard limit expires. Unlike the SPDB, the entries in the SAD are not ordered. 
Nonetheless, as is the case with SPDB lookups, the first matching SA entiy that is 
found in the SAD is used for the IPSec processing of the packets that are associated 
with the given SA.
2.7 IPSec Principle of Operation
The IPSec processes ensure secure communication between two communicating hosts 
based on a policy that is defined in a Security Policy Database (SPDB). The system 
administrator is responsible for establishing and maintaining the SPDB. Source and 
destination hosts check with the SPDB to make a decision, for each IP packet, whether 
the IP packet has to be protected by IPSec, or discarded, or allow it to bypass the IPSec 
stack.
SPDB is organized as an ordered list of rules. Each rule is identified by one or more 
selectors that define the type of IP traffic that will be affected by IPSec. Selectors might 
be the source and destination IP addresses the SPI, source and destination port numbers, 
and the protocol ID. Once the SPDB is consulted by the source or destination hosts with a 
specific selector, the established SA param eters are retrieved. Table 2.2 shows an 
example of SPDB.
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Security Policy Parameters Example Values
SPI 3219011
IP Destination Address 172.16.16.10
IP Destination Port 23
IP Source Address 172.16.16.15
IP Source Port 3290
Protocol TCP
Table 2.2: Example of SPDB
The processing of IPSec packets are done as follows [5], [6], [7], [8]:
- Outbound Traffic
Once the IPSec processes receive an IP packet to be sent from an application, 
it consults the SPDB to decide how to process this IP packet. If the packet 
must be IPSec enabled, an IPSec process retrieves the required SA from the 
SADB. If the necessary SA already exists, it is used to process the IP packet. 
In the contrary case, an IPSec process calls Internet Key Exchange protocol 
(IKE) to establish a new SA with specific security parameters.
For example, let us consider the network shown in the Figure 2.5. In this 
case, the host is tunneling a packet to the gateway using ESP but is 
authenticating to the end host B.
Figure 2.5: Outbound IPSec Processing
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The correct header is shown in Figure 2.6.
IP header ESP IP header AH Network payload
Src = Host A Src = HostA
Dst = Gateway B Dst = Host B
Figure 2.6 packet format
In this case, IKE establishes four SAs two for sending and two for receiving. 
As we are discussing the outbound processing, we will ignore the SAs 
established for processing inbound packets. The two outbound SAs are SAi 
and SA2 where SAi is the SA between A and the gateway and SA2 is the SA 
between the host and the destination. The ordering of IPSec processing is very 
important. If SA2 is applied after SA], the packet is formed incorrectly. It is 
very important to maintain ordering in the SA bundle so that IPSec processing 
is applied in the correct order for outbound packets.
- Inbound Traffic
Once the ISPec process receives an IP packet from the network, it inspects the 
header to decide if this packet was IPSec-enabled. If so , the IPSec process 
uses information in the incoming packet to determine the selectors that will be 
used to retrieve the defined policy from the SPDB. It also retrieves a pointer 
to the corresponding SADB where the security parameters are stored. These 
security parameters will be used for checking and/or deciphering of the packet 
in question.
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- Fragmentation
IPSec does not fragment or reassemble packets. On outbound processing, the 
transport payload is processed and then passed on to the IP layer for further 
processing. On inbound processing; the IPSec layer gets a reassembled packet 
from the IP layer. However, as IPSec does add IPSec header, it impacts the 
Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU) length. If IPSec does not participate in 
PMTU discovery, the IP layer ends up fragmenting a packet as the addition of 
the IPSec header increases the length of the IP datagram beyond the PMTU. It 
is important for IPSec to participate in the PMTU discovery process. This is 
discussed in greater detail in the Chapter IV on IPSec implementation.
- Internet Control Massage Protocol (ICMP)
ICMP (Internet Control Massage Protocol) processing is critical to the 
operation and debugging for a network. This protocol is runs on top of a 
network protocol such as IPv4 and IPv6. When IPSec is used end-to-end, it 
does not impact ICMP. However, when IPSec is used in tunnel mode, it 
impacts ICMP and the operation of the network. The problem arises in the 
tunnel mode, particularly when the tunnel header is added by an intermediate 
gateway. This is because ICMP messages are required to send only 64 bits of 
the original header. ICMP is used to determine if the host is reachable or not. 
ICMP is used in PMTU (Path Maximum Transfer Uunit) discovery If a router 
needs to fragment a packet but the “do not fragment” bit is set, then the router 
sends back an ICMP massage to host indicating the MTU of its link so that 
the host can generate packets whose size does not exceed this MTU.
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In order to handle ICMP error messages correctly, IPSec needs to maintain 
some state and perform extra processing.
- Path MTU
By default, the Maximum Segment Size (MSS) is 536 bytes. It is the 
maximum number of bytes that can be transported by TCP in a single packet. 
TCP fragments packets in a transmit queue into 536 byte chunks before 
passing them down to the IP layer. With a 536-byte MSS, packets are not 
likely to be fragmented at an IP device along the path to the destination 
because most links use an MTU of at least 1500 bytes. However, smaller 
packets also increase the amount of bandwidth used to transport overheads. 
Most routers of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) are equipped with a 
commode that can dynamically determine the largest MSS value without 
generating packets that need to be fragmented. It allows TCP to determine the 
smallest MTU size among all links in a TCP session and then this MTU value, 
less the number of bytes taken up by the IP and TCP headers, as the MSS for 
the session.
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CHAPTER HI: IPSec PROTOCOLS 
3.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we briefly review various IPSec protocols and their features. IETF has 
defined three protocols in IPSec:
1) IP Authentication Header (AH) Protocol “AH provides connectionless integrity, 
data origin authentication, and an optional anti-replay service” for each IP datagram 
packet [38].
2) Encapsulating Security Payload(ESP) Protocol “ESP provides data confidentiality 
(encryption), limited traffic flow confidentiality, connectionless integrity, data origin 
authentication, and an optional anti-replay service” for each IP datagram packet [43].
1) Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) 
“ISAKMP provides a method for automatically setting up security associations 
and managing the cryptographic keys” [44]. The details of these protocols are 
explained in the following sections.
3.2 The IP Authentication Header (AH) Protocol
3.2.1 Authentication Header (AH) Concept
The IP protocol is inherently insecure. The authentication mechanism that is used 
to provide integrity for the IP datagrams is rather primitive. The Authentication 
Header (AH) protocol was designed to improve the security of IP datagrams. AH 
provides connectionless integrity and data origin authentication and an anti-replay 
protection service [23]. AH uses cryptographic Message Authentication Codes
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3.2.2
(MAC) to authenticate IP datagrams. A MAC requires a secret key to generate the 
message digest of a bit-string. IPSec uses Internet Key Exchange (IKE) to 
negotiate, generate and put in place necessary cryptographic keys for AH or ESP. 
Since only the source and the destination nodes know the secret key, it should be 
computationally infeasible for an intruder to modify the datagram and recompute 
an authentication data that will be validated by the hosts. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3.1.
Original iP datagram
  ' i
IP header other headers and payioads
Digital signature (MD5 or SHA-1)
ip Auth. header other headers and payloads
Authenticated IP datagram  
Figure 3.1: Procedure for Authenticated IP Datagram
AH Protocol Format
According to IPSec specifications, data authentication is implemented by using an 
Authentication Header (AH) [23]. The AH is additional information, i.e.,a field, 
that is added to each IP datagram. It is calculated using all the fields in the IP 
datagram (IP header, TCP header, and user data). IP fields that change, such as 
Time-to-Live (TTL), are not included in the calculation. Figure 3.2 shows the AH 
protocol format in IPv4 for both the Transport Mode and the Tunnel Mode. As
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can be seen in Figure 3.2 for IPv4, the AH header is placed immediately after the 
IP header and before any transport protocol and user data.
original IPv4 packet
original TCPAJDP 
IP header header
AH In transport mode AH in tunnel mode
original AH TCPAJDP dataIP header heads 1 eader
new AH original TCPAJDP data fIP header header IP header header
encrypted _
authenticated
encrypted
authenticated
Next Payload Security Sequence Authentication Data
Header Length Parameter Index Number (Hash Checksum)
Figure 3.2: IPSec AH Protocol Format
AH consists of five fixed-length fields and a variable length Authentication Data field. 
Figure 3.3 shows the relative position of these fields in AH.
o 8 16 31
/ /
Next Header Payload Length R e se rv ed /
Security Parameter Index (SPI)
/
S e q u e n c e  N u m b er Field
/
/
Authentication Data (Hash Checksum)
— /
/
Figure 3.3: Authentication Header Format
2. N ext Header: This is an 8-bit field that identifies protocol ID of the transport
protocol that is included in the payload after the Authentication Header. The
protocol ID is a number that is chosen from a standard set of protocols ID defined
by IETF.
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3. Payload Length: This is an 8-bit field that specifies the length of AH in 32-bit 
words.
4. Reserved: This 16-bit field is reserved for future use.
5. Security Parameters Index (SPI): SPI is a random 32-bit value that is used with 
the destination IP address and security protocol (AH) to exclusively identify the 
Security Association for each IP datagram.
6. Sequence Number tSNI: This unsigned 32-bit field contains a monotonically 
increasing counter value that provides anti-replay security service against replay 
attacks. For each IP packet issued for a specific SA, the sequence number is 
incremented by one to guarantee that each IP packet is assigned a unique 
sequence number. The receiver host verifies each IP packet to guarantee the SN 
has not been reused. In this way, an attacker can not capture an IP packet, modify 
its content, and play it back.
7. Authentication Data: This is a variable-length field that contains a hash or 
Integrity Check Value (ICV) for each IP packet. It is produced by the sender host 
to protect a packet from modification during transit. A recipient host performs the 
same integrity check and compares the result of the hash algorithm with the result 
stored in this field. There are several types of authentication algorithms, such as 
MD5 and SHA-1. Each one produces different ICV values.
The AH protocol can be used when there is a need to protect the entire IP packet 
from being modified. The AH protocol can also be used when communications 
must be restricted to specific computers in a network. AH protocol ensures mutual
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authentication between communicating computers, such as trusted computers in a 
domain. If a host can not negotiate an SA, communications do not take place.
In summary, the AH protocol provides data integrity for the entire IP packet by 
using authentication algorithms such as MD5. It also provides data origin 
authentication by using a shared secret key or the SPI. Finally, AH protocol 
provides a mechanism against replay attack by using sequence numbers.
3.2.3 AH Modes
AH can be used in either transport or tunnel mode. The difference is the data being 
protected, either an upper-layer protocol or an entire IP datagram. In either case, AH also 
authenticates immutable portions of the outer IP header.
3.2.3.1 AH Transport Mode
When used in transport mode, AH protects end-to-end communication. The 
communications endpoint must be the IPSec endpoint. The AH header is inserted into the 
datagram to protect it by placing it immediately following the IP header (and any options) 
and before the upper layer protocol to protect. Figure 3.4 shows the position of AH-in 
transport mode relative to other header fields.
IPv4 header before applying AH
1 Variable length Transport protocol Transport protocol
Option field Header Data
IPv4 header after applying AH
Variable length
AH
Transport protocol Transport protocol
Option field Header Data
Figure 3.4: AH relative to other IPv4 header fields, in transport mode.
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The option field was eliminated in IPv6. The options, in this version of IP. are treated 
as separate headers called extension headers that are inserted after the IP header. This 
feature speeds up packet processing time in that, except for the hop-by-hop extension 
header which contains routing information that routers need to examine, the extension 
headers are not examined or processed by any intermediate node on the path from the 
source to the destination. They are only processed by the destination host. In transport 
mode for IPv6, the AH is inserted after the hop- by- hop, Routing and Fragmentation 
extension headers. Figure 3.5 illustrates this.
IPv6 header before applying AH
Original IP h ea d e r E x tension  h e a d e rs T ranspo rt pro toco l T ranspo rt p ro toco l
(If p resen t) h e a d e r da ta  I
IPv6 header after applying AH
Original IP h ea d e r
H op-by-Hop, R outing  and 
F ragm en ta tion  h ea d ers  
(If p resen t)
AH T ranspo rt protocol 
h ea d e r
T ranspo rt p ro toco l 
d a ta
Figure 3.5: AH relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in transport mode.
3.2.3.2 AH Tunnel Mode
When used in tunnel mode, AH encapsulates the protected datagram and an 
additional IP header is added before the AH header. The “internal” IP datagram 
contains the original addressing of the communication and the “outer” IP datagram 
contains the addresses of the IPSec end-points. Tunnel mode can be used as a 
replacement for transport mode for end-to-end security, but since there is no 
confidentiality and therefore no protection against traffic analysis, there is really no 
point in AH tunnel mode. AH is simply used to guarantee that the received packet
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was not modified in transit, that it was sent by the party claiming to have sent it, and 
optionally, that it is a fresh, nonreplayed packet.
In tunnel mode, AH is inserted before the original IP header and a new IP header, is 
consequently inserted in front of the AH. This is illustrated diagrammatically for IPv4 
in Figure 3.6 and for IPv6 in Figure 3.7, respectively.
IPv4 header before applying AH
I Variable length Transport protocol "ftansport protocol
Option field Header Data
IPv4 header after applying AH
New IP header 
Option field AH
Original IP header 
Option field
Transport protocol 
Header
|
Transport protocol 
Data
Figure 3.6: AH relative to other IPv4 header fields, in tunnel mode
IPv6 header before applying AH
Original IP header Extension headers 
(If present}
Transport prot 
header
;ocoi Transport protocol 
data
IPv6 header after applying AH
New IP 
header
Extension
headers AH Original IP
Extension
headers
Transport
protocol
Transport
protocol
(If present) header (If present) header data
Figure 3.7: AH relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in tunnel mode
The inner IP header carries the true source (the node that generated the packet, and the 
final destination address. Whereas, the outer IP header typically carries the sender’s 
security gateway address as the source address, and the recipient’s security gateway
59
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
address as the destination address. Consequently, the source address in the inner and 
outer IP headers may be different. The same holds for the destination address.
3.2.4 AH Processing
When an outbound packet matches an SPDB entry denoting protection with AH, the 
SADB is queried to see whether a suitable SA exists. If there is no SA, IKE can be used 
to dynamically create one. If there is an SA, AH is applied to the matched packet in the 
mode dictated by the SPDB entry. If there is an SPDB bundle, the order of application 
depends on the protocols involved. AH always protects ESP, not the other way around.
3.2.4.1 O utbound Processing
When an IPSec implementation receives an outbound packet it uses the relevant 
selectors (destination IP address and port, transport protocol, etc) to search the 
Security Policy Database (SPDB) to ascertain the policy that is applicable to the 
traffic. If IPSec processing is required and a SA or SA bundle has already been 
established, the SPDB entry that matches the selectors in the packet will point to the 
appropriate SA bundle in the SADB. If a SA has not been established, the IPSec 
implementation will create a SA and link it to the SPDB entry. The SA is then used to 
process the packet as follows:
1. Generate or increment Sequence Number as the sequence number is used to 
prevent replay of previously transmitted packets. When a new SA is 
established the sender initializes its sequence number counter to zero. For 
each packet that the sender transmits, it increases the sequence number by one 
and insert the resulting value of the sequence number counter into the 
sequence number field of the AH header.
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2. Calculate Integrity Check Value. The ICV is calculated using the values in the 
immutable fields of the IP header and the values of the mutable fields that are 
predictable mutable fields for the purpose of the ICV computation. The SA for 
the datagram stipulates the cryptographic authentication algorithm that should 
be used to generate the ICV. The available choices of authentication 
algorithms vary with different IPSec implementations. The ICV is generated 
into the variable length Authentication Data field of the AH, then if required, 
the datagram is fragmented into the appropriate fragment size and sent to the 
destination node.
3.2.4.2 Inbound Processing
When a datagram arrives at an IPSec host or security gateway, if the more fragment
bit is set, this is an indication that there are other fragments that are yet to arrive. The 
IPSec application therefore waits until a fragment arrives with a sequence number 
that is similar to the previous ones, and has the more fragment bit not set. It then 
reassembles the IP fragments, then performs the following steps:
1. It uses the SPI, destination IP address and IPSec protocol in the IP header 
(outer IP header if tunnel mode) to look up the SA for this datagram in the 
inbound SADB. If the look up fails, it drops the packet and logs the error.
2. It uses the SA found in (1) to do the IPSec processing. This involves first 
checking to determine whether the selectors in the IP headers (inner header if 
tunnel mode) match those in the SA. If the selectors do not match, the 
application drops the packet and audits the error. If the selectors match, the 
IPSec application keeps track of the SA and the order in which it is applied
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relative to the others and continues to do (1) and (2) until it encounters a non- 
IP Sec extension header or a transport layer protocol.
3. It uses the selectors in the packet to find a policy in the inbound SPD whose 
selectors match those of the packet.
4. It checks whether the SA’s found in (1) and (2) match the policy specified in
(3). If the check fails, repeat steps (4) and (5) until all policy entries have been 
check or until the check succeeds.
5. If anti-replay is enabled use the anti-replay window of the SA to determine if 
the packet is a replay. If the packet is a replay, drop it and log the error.
6. It uses the authentication algorithm specified by the SA bundle to calculate the 
ICV for the packet and compares it with the value stored in the Authentication 
Data field. If the two values differ, then it discards the packet and audit the 
error.
At the end of these steps, if the packet has not been discarded, it is passed to the
transport layer protocol, or is forwarded.
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3.3 The IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Protocol
3.3.1 Encapsulating Security Pavload (ESP) Protocol Concept
The ESP protocol can be used to guarantee one or any combination of the 
following security services [4]:
1. Data confidentiality - It guarantees that only the sender and the receiver are able 
to read user data. All intermediate nodes that are on the path can not read user 
data while in transit. This is accomplished by using a specific data encryption 
algorithm in the source and destination hosts with a secure key distribution 
mechanism.
2. Partial protection against traffic analysis - This service is only available in the 
tunnel mode of ESP protocol where the actual source and destination IP addresses 
are hidden. Only the source and destination IP addresses of the security gateways 
are exposed on the IP packet. An attacker in the middle can only see an IP packet 
that is going from one security gateway to another one without knowing the actual 
sender and receiver hosts.
3. AH Security Services
All the AH services, connectionless data integrity, data origin 
authentication, and protection against replay, can also be enabled in ESP 
protocol.
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3.3.2 ESP Protocol Format
Figure 3.8 shows IPSec ESP protocol format in both transport and tunnel modes. 
The confidentiality security service can be activated alone or with other services. 
Allowing confidentiality without other services makes traffic vulnerable to certain 
types of active attacks [25].
original IPv4 packet
original TCP/UDP 
IP header header
ESP In Transport Mode____________________ ESP In TUnnel Mode
IWW E S P original TCPAJDP data E S P  ' E S PIP header header IP li«ailt' header Trailer Auth
original E SP TCP/UDP data ESP E S PIP header header header - Trailer Auth
encrypted
'"authenticated
Security S eq u en ce
P aram eter index | Number
encrypted
a u th e n tic a te d ^ - '-
Padding Padding
Length
Next H eader 
(TCP/UDP)
Figure 3.8: IPSec ESP Protocol Format
Similar to AH protocol, authentication and integrity are enabled together and 
provided by the use of an ICV or hash value. Protection against replay attacks is 
achieved by the use of a sequence number which the receiver uses to check every 
incoming packet. ESP protocol provides integrity service by signing the ESP header, 
TCP/UDP header user data, and the ESP trailer. It also prevents IP packets from 
inspection by encrypting the TCP/UDP header, user data, and the ESP trailer.
AH and ESP protocols can be combined together in the same SA. While both AH 
and ESP provide integrity protection for user data, AH protects the entire IP packet 
from modification while ESP protocol protects only the TCP/UDP header and user 
data from inspection through encryption.
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ESP packets consist of four fixed-length fields and 3 variable-length fields. Figure 3.9 
shows the packet format of this protocol. A brief description of each field is as 
follows.
le 2 4 31
S ecu rity  P a ra m e te rs  In d e x  (S P I)
S e q u e n c e  N u m b er
P.iyin.id D ata (V ariab le)
{0 -  2 5 5  b y te ,)
P.m! L ength N ext liertfb-!
A u th en tica tio n  D a ta  (Variable)
Figure 3.9: ESP Packet Format.
1. Security Parameter Index (SPI) - The SPI is a 32-bit integer that is used in 
combination with the source or destination address and the IPSec protocol to 
uniquely identify the SA for the datagram. The range of numbers from 1 to 255 
are reserved by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) for future use, 
and 0 is reserved for local and implementation specific use. Therefore the current 
valid SPI values are between 256 and 2 - 1  inclusively. This is similar to the AH 
SPI field.
2. Sequence Number (SN) - As is the case for the AH, this contains a 32-bit 
unsigned integer which servers as a monotonically increasing counter. The 
sender’s and receiver’s sequence number counters are initialized to 0 when the SA 
is established. The sender consequently increases its sequence number by one for
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every packet it sends using a given SA. The sequence number is used to prevent 
intruders from capturing and re-sending previously transmitted datagrams.
3. Payload Data - This field contains the padding bits, if any, that are utilized by the 
encryption algorithm, or that are used to align the pad Length field so that it 
begins at the third byte within the 4-byte word. The length of this field can be 
between 0 and 255 bytes inclusively.
4. Pad Length - The Pad Length field is a 8-bit field which indicates the number of 
padding bytes in the Padding field. The valid values for this field are integers 
between 0 and 255 inclusively.
5. Next Header - This is a 8-bit field that identifies the type of data encapsulated in 
the payload. It may indicate an IPv6 extension header or a transport layer 
protocol; refer to [47] for the set of assigned IP protocol numbers.
6 . Authentication Data - This is a variable-length field that contains the Integrity 
Check Value (ICV), which as indicated by Figure 3.14, is calculated over the 
length of the ESP packet minus the Authentication data field. The length of this 
field is specified by the authentication algorithm employed for the authentication.
3.3.3 ESP Modes
The ESP protocol is used when there is a need to protect user data and the 
TCP/UDP header from being observed. The ESP protocol is also used to protect 
the TCP/UDP header and application data from modification during transmission. 
In summary, the ESP protocol provides confidentiality for user data in each IP 
packet. It also provides partial protection against traffic analysis when it is used in
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the tunnel mode. Finally, ESP protocols provides data integrity where only the 
user data and TCP/UDP header are authenticated, compared to the authentication 
of the entire IP packet in AH protocol as shown in Figure 3.8 and 3.14.
As is the case for AH, the location of the ESP data in the packet depends on the 
mode of operation of ESP. There are two modes of operation: transport mode and 
tunnel mode. These modes of operation will be discussed in the following two 
subsections.
3.3.3.1 ESP Transport Mode
In transport mode, the ESP header is inserted after the IP header and any
options it contains but before any transport layer protocol, or before any
IPSec protocol that has already been applied, as illustrated in Figure 3.10.
O riginal IP d a ta g ra m
IP liead e i
Encry
o tlie i h e a u e is  a n d  p a y lo a d s
Is  h e a a e i E S P  h e a d e r o th e i h e a d e rs  a n a  p a y io a d s  E S P tia l le r
IP datagram with transport ESP
Figure 3.10: IP Datagram with Transport ESP Mode
So, for IPv4 in transport mode, ESP is inserted after the variable length
options “filed show in field, Figure 3.11.
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IPv4 header before applying ESP
Variable length Transport protocol Transport protocol 1
Option field Header Data I
IPv4 header after applying ESP
Variable length 
Option field
ESP
Header
Transport protocol 
Header
Transport protocol 
■ Data
ESP
Trailer
ESP Authentication 
Data
<----------------Encrypted-------------------------- }
k ------------------------- Authenticated--------------------------*
Figure 3.11: ESP relative to other IPv4 header fields, in transport mode.
Figure 3.11 shows the position of ESP in transport mode relative to other 
header fields. In this diagram, the ESP Header field consists of the SPI and 
Sequence number fields’ whereas the ESP Trailer authentication services 
are applied as shown in Figure 3.12. In transport mode, for IPv6, the ESP 
header is inserted after the Hop-by-Hop. Routing and Fragmentation 
extension headers .Figure 3.16 illustrates this.
IPv6 header before applying ESP
O riginal IP h e a d e r E x ten s io n  h e a d e rs  
(IT p resen t)
T ra n sp o rt p ro to co l 
h e a d e r
T ra n sp o rt p ro toco l 
d a ta
IPv6 header after applying ESP
Original IP 
h e a d e r
Hop-by-Hop, R ou ting  and  
F rag m e n ta tio n  h e a d e rs  
(If p re sen t)
ESP
H eader
T ra n sp o rtp ro to co l
h ea d e r
T ra n sp o rt pro toco l 
d a ta
ESP
Trailer
ESP 1
A u th en tica tio n ! 
D ata |
4------------------ E n c ry p ted --------------------------- *1
k --------- ----------------- A u th e n tic a te d --------------------— #
Figure 3.12: ESP relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in transport mode.
o 3.3.3.2 ESP Tunnel Mode
In tunnel mode, ESP is inserted before the original IP header and a new IP
header is consequently inserted in front of the ESP header. This is
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illustrated in Figure 3.13 for IPv4 and for IPv6 in Figure 3.14, 
respectively.
IPv4 header befo re applying ESP
Variable length Transport protocol Transport protocol
Option field Header Data
IPv4 header after applying ESP
New IP h e a d e r
Option field
ES P
H eader
Original.IP header. 
Option field
Transport protocol 
H eader
Transport protocol 
Data
E S P
Trailer
E S P  Authentication 
D ata
_ . .
k ----- v —A uth en tica ted —-------------- i
Figure 3.13: ESP relative to other IPv4 header fields, in tunnel mode.
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Figure 3.14: ESP relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in tunnel mode
The inner IP header carries the true source (the node that generated the 
packet) and the final destination address. The outer IP header typically 
carries the sender’s security gateway address as the source address, and 
the recipient’s security gateway address as the destination address.
Consequently, the source address in the inner and outer IP headers may be 
different; the same holds for the destination address.
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3.3.4 ESP Processing
Processing of an IP packet with ESP depends partly on the mode in which ESP is being 
employed. In either case, though, one thing to remember is that with ESP, the ciphertext is 
authenticated.
3.3.4.1 Outbound Processing
When an IPSec implementation receives an outbound packet it uses the relevant 
selectors (destination IP address and port, transport protocol, etc) to search the 
security Policy Database (SPDB) to ascertain what policy is applicable to the 
traffic. If IPSec processing is required and a SA or SA bundle has already been 
established, the SPDB entry that matches the selectors in the packet will point to 
the appropriate SA bundle in the SADB. If a SA has not been established, the IPSec 
implementation will create a SA and link it to the SPDB entry. The SA is then used 
to process the packet as follows:
1. Generate or Increment Sequence Number - The sequence number is used 
to prevent replay of previously transmitted packets. When a new SA is 
established the sender initializes its sequence number counter to zero. For 
each packet that the sender transmits, it increases the sequence number by one 
and insert the resulted value of the sequence number counter into the sequence 
number field of the ESP packet.
2. Encrypt the Packet - If the traffic requires confidentiality services the SA 
will specify the encryption algorithm to be used. The available choices of 
encryption algorithms depends on the IPSec implementation. However, only 
private-key cryptosystems are currently used because of the slow execution 
speed of public key cryptosystems compared to private-key enciphering
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
systems, as discussed in Chapter 1. For interoperability, all IPSec 
implementations must provide DES in CBC mode as an encryption algorithm 
option. When the encryption algorithm requires an Initial Vector(IV) as is the 
case with DES in CBC mode, the IV is carried in the first few bytes of the 
Payload Data field. As illustrated in Figures 3.14, the ESP header, the SPI 
(Security parameter index) and the Sequence number, are not encrypted. This 
is so because the destination node needs the SPI to look up the SA of the 
packet, and it requires the Sequence Number to ascertain whether or not the 
packet is a re-play of a previously transmitted packet. The authentication data 
is similarly not encrypted because the receiving node must authenticate the 
packet before it decrypts it. This will be discussed further in the discussion of 
ESP Inbound Processing. When encryption service is required the packet must 
be encrypted before the calculation of the ICV.
3. Calculate the Integrity Check Value - If the SA for the packet stipulates that 
ESP authentication service should be applied, the ICV is calculated using the 
values in all the fields of the ESP packet except the Authentication Data field, 
then the ICV is inserted in the Authentication Data field. The SA for the 
packet specifies the algorithm that should be used to generate ICV. The 
available choices of authentication algorithms vary with different IPSec 
implementation. However, for interoperability, all implementations are 
required to support HMAC with MD5, and HMAC with SHA-1. If 
fragmentation is required, the packet is broken into the appropriate sizes then 
sent on route to the destination node.
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3.3.4.2 Inbound Processing
When a packet arrives at an IPSec host or security gateway, if the more fragment bit 
is set, this is an indication that there are other fragments that are yet to arrive. The 
IPSec application therefore waits until a fragment arrives with a sequence number 
that is similar to the previous ones, and has the more fragment bit not set. It then 
reassembles the IP fragments, then performs the following steps:
1. Use the destination IP address and IPSec protocol in the IP header (outer IP 
header if tunnel mode), and the SPI in the ESP header to look up the SA for the 
packet in the inbound SADB. If the lookup fails, it drops the packet and logs the 
error.
2. Use the SA found in (1) to process the ESP packet. This involves first checking to 
determine whether the selectors in the IP headers (inner header if tunnel mode) 
match those in the SA. If the selectors do not match, the application drops the 
packet and audit the error. If the selectors match, the IPSec application keeps 
track of the SA and the order in which it is applied relative to the others, and 
continues to do (1) and (2) until it encounters a non-IPSec extension header or a 
transport layer protocol.
3. Use the selectors in the packet to find a policy in the inbound SPD whose 
selectors match those of the packet.
4. Check whether the SAs found in (1) and (2) match the policy specified in (3). If 
the check fails, repeat steps(4) and (5) until all policy entries have been check or 
until the check succeeds.
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5. If anti-replay is enabled, use the anti-replay window of the SA or SA bundle to 
determine if the packet is a replay. If the packet is a replay, drop it and log the 
error.
6 . If the SA stipulates that authentication service is required, then uses the 
authentication algorithm and the private-key specified by the SA bundle to 
calculate the ICV for the packet and compares it with the value stored in the ESP 
Authentication Data field. If the two values differs, then discard the packet and 
audit the error.
7. If the SA indicates the application of confidentiality service use the cryptographic 
algorithm and the private-key that the SA specifies to decrypt the packet. 
Decryption processes are in general quite CPU and memory intensive. If the 
IPSec system is allowed to perform unnecessary decryption or encryption of 
packets, then the system will be vulnerable to denial of service attack. 
Consequently, when decryption or encryption is required, this service is applied 
after the packet has been successfully authenticated.
At the end of these steps if the packet has not been discarded, it is then passed to the
transport layer protocol, or is forwarded.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3.4 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol
3.4.1 IKE Protocol Concept
Prior to an IP packet being secured by IPSec , a security association (SA) must exist. As 
stated earlier, SAs may be created manually or dynamically. The Internet Key Exchange 
(IKE) is used to create them dynamically. IKE negotiates SAs on behalf of IPSec and 
populates the SADB.
IKE, described in [40], is a hybrid protocol. It is based on a framework defined by 
the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), defined in 
[41], and implements parts of two key management protocols, Oakley and SKEME [37]. 
In addition IKE defines two exchanges of its own.
o ISAKMP was developed by researchers at the National Security Agency (NSA) 
[41], The NSA used to be a super secret organization whose existence was denied 
by the United States government. Recently, the NSA has come out of the shadows 
and its considerable expertise in cryptography and security has been put to visible 
use. ISAKMP is one such output, 
o Oakley is a protocol developed by Hilarie Orman, a cryptographer from the 
University of Arizona [42], It is a free-form protocol that allows each party to 
advance the state of the protocol at is own speed. From Oakley, IKE borrowed the 
idea of different modes, each party producing a similar result; an authenticated 
key exchange through the exchange of information at different speeds. In Oakley, 
there was no definition of information required to exchange with each message.
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The modes were examples of how Oakley could be utilized to achieve a secure key 
exchange. IKE codified the modes into exchanges. By narrowing the flexibility of the 
Oakley model, IKE limits the wide range of possibilities that Oakley allows yet still 
provides multiple modes, albeit in a well-defined manner.
o SKEME is another key exchange protocol, designed by cryptographer Hugo 
Krawczyk [50], SKEME defines a type of authenticated key exchange in which 
the parties use public key encryption to authenticate each other and “share” 
components of the exchange. Each side encrypts a random number in the public 
key of the peer and both random numbers (after decryption) contribute to the 
ultimate key. One can optionally do a Diffie-Hellman exchange along with the 
SKEME share technique for Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), or merely use 
another rapid exchange, which does not require public key operations, to refresh 
an existing key. IKE borrows this technique directly from SKEME for one of its 
authentication methods (authentication with public key encryption) and also 
borrows the notion of rapid key refreshment without PFS.
It is upon these three protocols ISAKMP, Oakley, and SKEME that IKE is based. It is a 
hybrid protocol: it uses the foundation of ISAKMP, the modes of Oakley, and the share 
and rekeying techniques of SKEME to define its own unique way of deriving 
authenticated keying material and negotiating shared policy, as is demonstrated in Figure 
3.15. The contributions of Oakley and SKEME can be seen in the discussion of IKE 
itself, but the contributions of ISAKMP are sufficiently considerable to warrant a 
separate discussion.
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secure IKE negotiations
Exchange certificates/signatures
Figure 3.15: IKE parameters
3.4.2 ISAKMP
ISAKMP defines how two peers communicate, how the messages they use to 
communicate are constructed, and also defines the state transitions they go through to 
secure their communication. It provides the means to authenticate a peer, to exchange 
information for a key exchange, and to negotiate security services.
ISAKMP defines procedures and packet formats to negotiate, establish, modify and 
delete SAs.
ISAKMP provides a common framework for the format of SA attributes and the 
methodologies for negotiating, modifying and deleting SAs that different key 
exchange protocols can use. ISAKMP defines several payloads. These payloads 
provides modular building block for constructing ISAKMP messages. The ISAKMP 
header format and the Generic Payload header as well as the various payloads that 
IKE uses are given in Appendix A4 for interested reader.
It must be noted that IKE uses a variety of payloads as listed below:
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1) Security Association Payload
2) Proposed Association Payload
3) Transform Association Payload
4) Key Exchange Association Payload
5) Identification Payload
6) Certificate Payload
7) Hash Payload
8) Signature Payload
9) Source Payload
For a description and format of the above payload consult the Appendix A4.
o Message Format
The ISAKMP specification has a complete description of payload formats and 
payload specific attributes.
Payloads are chained together in a message by using the next payload field in the 
generic header (see Figure 3.16). The ISAKMP header describes the first payload 
following the header, and each payload describes which payload comes next. The last 
payload in the message is zero.*
*
ISAKMP communication is done via UDP port 500. Other port protocol combinations are 
possible, but UDP port 500 has been reserved by IANA (Internet Assigned Number 
Authority) for ISAKMP and all ISAKMP implementations are required to support 
communication over UDP port 500.
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
0
i
7
1
15
I
23 31
1--------------------- '7" 7 7 /
Initiator Cookie /
Responder Cookie
/
Next Payload 
KE
Major
Version
Minor
Version Exchange Type Flags. /
Message ID
/
Message Length
✓ »
Next Payload 
Nonce RESERVED KE Payload Length
KE Payload Data J/
Next Payload RESERVED Nonce Payload Length /(
Nonce Payload Data
7
JSAKMP
f Header
Key Exchange (KE) 
Payload
-Nonce Payload
Figure 3.16: ISAKMP Payloads Chained to form a Massage
3.4.3 Exchanges and Phases
ISAKMP describes two separate phases of negotiation. In the first phase, peers establish 
an authenticated and secure channel between themselves. In the second phase, the 
authenticated and secure channel is used to negotiate security services for a different 
protocol such as IPSec.
3.4.3.1 Exchange Phases
IKE presents different exchanges in modes which operate in one of two ISAKMP
negotiation phases:
(1) Phase 1 Negotiation
In this phase, two ISAKMP communicating peers establish an 
ISAKMP SA which essentially is an agreement on how further 
negotiation traffic between the peers will be protected. This
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ISAKMP SA is then used to protect the negotiation of SAs for 
other protocols, such as ESP or AH.
(2) Phase 2 Negotiation
This phase is used to establish SAs for other security services, such 
as AH or ESP. A single Phase 1 SA can be used to establish many 
Phase 2 SAs.
3.4.3.2 Exchange Modes
1. IKE currently defines four possible modes of exchange: Main Mode,
Aggressive Mode, Quick Mode and New Group Mode. The first three 
negotiate SAs: whereas in the latter Transform Payload(s) encapsulated in 
Proposal Payload(s) which is/are encapsulated in Security Association 
Payload(s). These exchange modes will be discussed briefly in the subsequent 
subsection.
1. Main Mode
Main Mode is an adaptation of the ISAKMP “Identity Protection 
Exchange”. It involves an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange. It 
is used to negotiate Phase 1 ISAKMP SA. This exchange mode was 
designed to separate key exchange information from the identity and 
authentication information. The separation of these information provides 
protection for the identity of the communicating peers since the identity 
information can be exchanged under the protection of the previously 
generated Diffie-Hellman shared secret at the expense of two or three 
additional messages. Figure 3.17 shows an example of a Main Mode 
exchange.
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IKE SA-Main Mode {phase 1)
ResponderInitiator
HDR SA
HDR SA
HDR KE
HDR KE
AUTHIDii
HDR’ AUTHIDir
Figure 3.17: Example of a Main Mode Exchange 
2. Aggressive Mode
Aggressive Mode is an implementation of ISAKMP “Aggressive Mode 
Exchange” it is used to negotiate ISAKMP Phase 1 SA where identity 
protection of the communicating peers is not required. This exchange 
mode allow the SA, Key Exchange and Authentication related payloads to 
be transmitted together. Combining these payloads into one message 
reduces the number of round-trips at the expense of not providing 
protection of the identity of the communicating peers. Figure 3.18 shows 
an example of an Aggressive Mode exchange.
IKE SA -
Initiator
Aggressive Mode (phase 1)^
Responder
(. U [ nUrv | on j fvfc j Ni
(2)
p.
Figure 3.18: Example of an Aggressive Mode Exchange.
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3. Quick Mode
Quick mode is used to negotiate phase 2 SA under the protection of the 
negotiated Phase 1 ISAKMP SA. All of the payloads in a Quick Mode 
exchange are encrypted. Figure 3.19 shows an example of a Quick Mode 
exchange.
Initiator
wrs>
Quick Mode (phase 2)
ISAKMP SA (phase 1)
Resoonder
C D fS P I  HDR*|HASH{1)|SA|Ni|KE|lDi|IDrp» 
(2) HDR*[HASH(2)|SA|NrjKE[lDillDr]C !
(3) HDR*|HASH(3)|l
Figure 3.19 Example of a Quick Mode exchange.
4. New Group Mode
The New Group Mode (NGM) is used to negotiate new group for Diffie- 
Hellman key exchange. NGM is carried out under the protection of ISAKMP 
phase 1 exchange.
3.4.4 Oakley Groups
The IKE protocol allows negotiation of the group for Diffie-Hellman exchange. The
original specification of IKE defined four groups that originated from the Oakley 
Protocol. These groups are presented below.
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CHAPTER IV: A FRAMEWORK FOR IPSEC FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
4.1 Introduction
IPSec provides the essential components to codify on IP-based Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) infrastructure [42]. Widespread implementation is likely because of 
the security required in Internet communications. IPSec as described in Chapters II 
and III is composed of a number of different pieces that makes its one-piece 
implementation extremely difficult, if  not impossible. The major issues in 
implementing IPSec are: 1) performance, 2) applicability to different operation 
environment that have special requirements, 3) integration with network management 
systems, 4) expandability to adapt to network changes, enhancements, and new 
policies, and finally 5) modular implementation that can easily be modified. 
Although, IPSec enabled routers and gateways has been available commercially by 
venders such as Lucent IPSec* VPN, Cisco IOS IPSec/SSL* VPN, and Nortel* VPN 
router, no clear functional design and/or architecture for realization o f IPSec system 
is supplied in the literature.
* Lucent IPSec Virtual Private Network: A Technical Review, White paper, 2001
* IPSec Features in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.3T, 12.3, and 12.2T, White paper, Sept. 2004.
* Nortel VPN Router Portfolio
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Free S/WAN IPSec is a freely available commercial off-the-shelf implementation of 
IPSec, which is installed in all Linux gateways. This implementation lacks some 
functionality. In practice, integrating network management, routing, QoS, and security 
requires the interoperability o f IPSec and key management over multiple platform (e.g. 
Cisco, Microsoft Windows 2000, and Red Hat Linux). Keromytis, etal implemented 
IPSec protocols for BSD/OS, Linux, OpenBSD, and NetBSD operating environment.[46] 
This implementation includes only kernel patches for processing incoming and outgoing 
IP datagrams, maintaining the database and policy table as well as a set o f tools for 
configuring the policy table. In Ref [47], the authors propose an IPSec implementation 
on Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGA. However, this can implement only some functions of 
IPSec features, and is based on processing the IPSec inbound and outbound traffic using 
FPGAs. R ef [48] proposes an FPGA-based adaptive cryptographic engine for IPSec 
architectures, and focuses on the encryption/decryption aspects only.
With security service proliferation, and as authentication and encryption algorithms 
become stronger, so does IPSec. It is important to note that IPSec is only as strong as the 
methods chosen for its implementation.
We are now in a position to propose a framework on a layered security functional 
architecture to implement the IPSec full range of functionality for enterprise networks. 
The proposed functional architecture is modular and makes it possible to compose IPSec 
software applications from products developed by different supplies at different times. 
The design requirements and specifications for the accompanying Security Management 
Information Base (SMIB) is describe in Sec.4.3.
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4.2 IPSec Functional Architecture
IPSec provides security services at IP layer (Network layer) by enabling a system to 
select required security mechanisms, determine the algorithms to use for the services, 
and put in place any cryptographic keys required to provide the requested services. 
We propose structuring the IPSec functionality based on the framework of the logical 
security management system and method, as described in [44]. In this architecture 
basic functionality of IPSec is organized in logical function layers. The basic IPSec 
data is stored and managed by an IP security management information base 
(IPSMIB). The developed architecture, shown in Fig.4.1,
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IPSec Security Services
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Figure 4.1: IPSec functional five logical layers.
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implements IPSec functionality through five logical layers. Each layer has a modular 
architecture and is made of one or several “modules”. Modules use the services of an 
infrastructure of independent lowerlayer functions to support their own offered 
functions and to communicate among themselves. It is seen that IPSec physical 
realization requires multiple modules at each layer. The five functional layers of 
IPSec are described in the following subsections.
4.2.1 -  IPSec Policy & Business Management Function layer
4.2.1.1 - IPSec Policy Concepts
A policy defines a definite goal, course, or method of action to guide and 
determine present and future decisions. In the context of IPSec management, it 
can be seen that an IPSec policy consists of rules for providing security protection 
to IP traffic. As an example, a policy may call for all traffic originated from a 
given IP address to be protected by AH in tunnel mode using an integrity 
protection service based on the key hashing algorithm SHA-1.
A complicated IPSec policy may include multiple nested SAs.
a) Policy Definition Requirement
The design for a policy definition and management system must not 
constrain the richness of IPSec. Therefore, there are several requirements 
imposed on any policy system. These requirements are very high level 
because there is no single mechanism for policy definition and 
management. Different IPSec implementation will have different 
requirement. These are not all the requirements set of policy but merely a 
large set that any system will be abide by:
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o Ability to configure multiple policies per host,
o Ability to configure policy per network,
o Ability to configure security at the granularity of an application,
o Ability to specify multiple protocols per flow,
o Ability to specify the desired action for each flow,
o Ability to configure tunnels of more than one level deep (nested
tunnel)
o Ability to supply different IKE identities for access and 
authentication.
o Ability to selectively disable automated key management,
o Ability to support multiple security options,
b) Policy representation
Policy representation involves two aspects. The physical representation -  
defining the format in which the policy is represented, where it is stored, 
how it is updated, modified, and what protocols are used to update the 
policy;
o The interface representation -  defining how the various IPSec 
components acquire and manage a policy.
Figure 4.2 shows the most popular paradigm that currently exists for 
policy configuration and distribution.
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Figure 4.2: Policy deployment architecture.
The policy is stored centrally in a policy server. The policy server is 
responsible for maintaining the policy for all nodes (host and router) in the 
domain. The policy server provides the capability to configure security for 
all the nodes. The policy is either downloaded into the various nodes in the 
network or is fetched dynamically by the nodes using directory services 
protocol such as LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol).
c) Policy management
Policy management defines the following interfaces:
o Interface between the directory service and the IPSec Policy 
database located in IPSMIB segments; 
o Interface between the User Interface application and the local 
policy database that allows read, write, and modify access to the 
database;
o Interface between IKE and policy database; 
o Interface between kernel and the policy database.
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4.2.1.2- IPSec Policy Management Function layer
This is the upper most functions in implementing IPSec in an enterprise 
environment. This function determines the general goals and policy for each 
security service implemented through IPSec, as set by the corporation’s security 
vision. The current IPSec specifications don’t identify any function in this layer. 
This policy management layer significantly simplifies the task of defining, 
deploying, and maintaining security policies across a network, therely 
significantly simplifying layer-scale IPSec deployment. In addition, the IPSecc 
Policy Management function can include the following functions: are as follows:
d) Prevention and detection of IPSec security violation -  A set of rules can be 
Implemented in a rule -  based system to detect intrusion by observing IPSec 
events and making a decision whether a given IPSec pattern of activities is 
suspicious.
e) Network wide IPSec implementation policy -  Once this layer is in place, 
multiple IP security policy requirements can be accessed to support the many 
aspects of IPSec security across the enterprise network.
f) Disaster Recovery
Figure 4.3: IPSec Policy and Business Management function Layer.
Currently, separate Policy-based IPSec management systems are employed to manage a 
network as a whole.
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4.2.2 IPSec Management Function Layer
The IPSec security management function layer provides a completely integrated and 
centralized management option for IPSec implementation. This function will support 
multiple IPSec security services, VPN, and QoS with one effective configuration. This 
layer is concerned with security aspects which are outside normal scope of IPSec security 
services, but which are needed to support and control IPSec security services and 
mechanisms. The IPSec security management function, in general, are as follows:
a) Policy Control and management of security services -  A set of security- 
related parameters and information to provision and control IPSec security 
services for centrally provisioned and managed for large -  scale IPSec 
networks.
b) Event Logging -  A function that maintains logs of connection attempts and 
traffic flow, including detailed IKE and IPSec negotiation.
c) IPSec services monitoring -  A group of software functions to monitor IPSec 
tunnels activity, and can provide continuous traffic statistics (in real -  time).
d) User Interface -  A set of functions to manage the IPSec GUI (Graphical User 
Interface) and provide online help search capabilities.
e) Interoperability -  A set of functions needed if the IPSec server is required to 
exchange network management information automatically with other network 
IP servers and IPSec servers. Note that not all IPSec management features are 
currently available with IP services routers.
f) Recovery and Backup -  A set of functions for key and security state recovery 
in case of security breaches and backup software based on IPSec event log
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massages. These tasks may be implemented monolithically or as individual 
software modules.
In addition to the above functions, this layer can include a module that implements the 
task of performing online secure upgrades of the modules in the lower layers of the 
architecture. The IPSec security management function layer is shown in Figure4.4 below.
Figure 4.4: IPSec Security Management Layer
4.2.3 -  IPSec Security Services Layer
The services provided by IPSec are implemented through modules in the security 
services layer of the proposed architecture. These services are as follows [48]:
1. Access control
2. Integrity
3. Authentication
4. Confidentiality (encryption) and privacy (limited traffic flow confidentiality)
5. Rejection of replayed packets
This layer is illustrated in Figure 4.5 below.
Figure 4.5: IPSec Security Services Layer
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As per the IPSec specification, these services are provided by two protocols, namely 
Authentication Header (AH) [49] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [25]. The 
services provided by each protocol are shown in Table 1 below [8], Note that ESP can be 
applied in two manners: with and without authentication.
Table 4.1: Security Services Provided by AH and ESP
AH ESP(encryption only)
ESP
(encryption, and
authentication)
Access control Y Y Y
Inbegrity Y Y
Authentication Y Y
Confidentiality Y Y
Privacy Y Y
Rejection -of replayed
packets Y Y Y
4.2.4 -  IPSec security Mechanism Layer
In some literature, \security services" and \security mechanisms" are interchangeable. 
In the proposed architecture we make a clear distinction between services and 
mechanisms, with a service in the previous layer implementing one or more mechanisms 
in this layer. The manner in which mechanisms are used to implement the security 
services is dependent on the specific IPSec implementation [37].
The security mechanism layer is composed of stand-alone modules that are needed to 
support the IPSec security services. Of the IPSec security services in use, cryptographic 
techniques form the majority [43].
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The IPSec security mechanisms can be divided into five groups:
1. Encryption: Symmetric encryption techniques are used to provide confidentiality, 
while public-key encryption techniques are used in authentication, certificates, and key 
management mechanisms.
2. Message authentication: Hashed Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) [5] are 
used to provide authentication and data integrity [43].
3. Key management: The key management mechanism involves the determination and 
distribution of secret keys. Two types of key management are required as per the IPSec 
specification: manual key management where a system is manually configured with its 
own keys and the keys of any communicating systems, and automated key management 
where keys are generated on-demand [48]. The default automated key management 
protocol for IPSec is Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol 
(ISAKMP)/Oakley [46]. ISAKMP provides the framework for key management, while 
Oakley is a secure adaptation of the Diffe-Hellman key exchange algorithm [46].
ISAKMP does not specifically dictate a key exchange algorithm; Oakley is the key 
exchange algorithm that was required for use with the first version of ISAKMP [43]. 
Other key exchange algorithms may be used, such as RSA [41] or Diffe-Hellman.
4. Certificates: Public-key certificates are used by key management services. The types of 
certificates or certificate related information may include [43]: PGP certificates, Kerberos 
tokens, X.509 certificates, DNS signed of keys, and SPKI certificates.
5. Digital signatures: Digital signatures are used in certificates to verify the authenticity 
the certificate and the identity of the entity using the certificate. DSS [12] or RSA may be 
used. These mechanisms are illustrated in Figure 4.6 below.
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Figure 4.6: IPSec Security Mechanisms Layer
4.2.5 — IPSec Primitive Function Layer
The lowest layer of the proposed architecture consists of the mathematical operations 
and algorithms required by the security mechanisms in the previous layer [7].
We propose the implementation of each primitive mathematical module as one or 
more atomic functions; that is, each function is self-contained, with its performance not 
affecting any of the other functions in that module.
The rudimentary mathematical functions required by the services and mechanisms of 
IPSec can be divided into five groups:
1. Prime number generation: Some IPSec mechanisms, such key management, require 
the selection of one or more very large prime numbers at random; thus, the prime number 
generation module must contain functions to generate these numbers. At present there are 
no computationally simple techniques that definitively yield arbitrarily large primes; the 
procedure that is used is to generate at random, using a pseudo random number generator, 
an odd number of the desired order of magnitude, and then test whether this number is 
prime. A variety of tests and algorithms for primality have been developed; one of the 
more efficient and popular algorithms in use is the Miller-Rabin algorithm [32],
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2. Modular arithmetic: The modular arithmetic module should contain functions for 
modular multiplication, multiplicative inverse, fast exponentiation, Chinese Remainder 
Theorem (CRT), and discrete logarithms.
3. Encryption fundamentals'. The current specification of IPSec indicates that DES in 
cipher block chaining (CBC) mode must be supported for symmetric encryption [43]; 
however, other algorithms may be used for symmetric encryption, such as: three-key 
triple DES [15], RC5 [16, 17], IDEA [18], three-key triple IDEA [15], CAST [19], and 
Blowfish [20, 21],
4. One-way hash codes: The authentication mechanisms that must be supported in an 
IPSec implementation are HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-1-96 [43]; both use the first 
96 bits of the value returned by the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
algorithm [5] using either the MD5 [10] or SHA-1 [23] hash codes.
5. Elliptic curve arithmetic: The elliptic curve arithmetic library contains the algorithms 
required to perform elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Presently ECC is not used in 
IPSec implementations, but it is anticipated that it will be used in the future.
The modules in this layer are depicted in Figure 4.7 below.
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Figure 4.7: Primitive Modules Layer
94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4.3 IPSec Protocol Handling Function
The current IPSec specification employs three protocols:
1. Authentication Header (AH) [3]
2. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [4]
3. Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [5] 
Handling these protocols for both transport mode and tunnel mode in an IPSec
network requires accessibility to the modules in the layers of the proposed architecture. 
To effectively realize IPSec, we proposed the implementation an \IPSec Protocol 
Handling Function" as shown previously in Figure 1. The IPSec protocol handling 
function performs these two overall functions:
1. For outgoing data, it interfaces with the layers to perform the necessary 
processing into IPSec packets, and then passes the packets to the operating 
system of the system on which IPSec is realized for transmission over the 
network.
2. It accepts incoming IPSec packets from the operating system, extracts the data, 
and passes the data on to the appropriate IPSec layer for processing into data 
usable by the system on which IPSec is implemented.
In a typical protocol handling process for IPSec we need a dispatcher and a message 
processing unit (MPU), as depicted in Figure 4.8 below. For outgoing packets, the 
dispatcher accepts outgoing data from the system, determines what protocol needs to be 
applied to the data and passes it on to the appropriate MPU. The MPU prepares the data 
for transmission by interfacing with the modules in the layers, wrapping the data in the 
appropriate IPSec header, and then returning the data to the dispatcher, which then
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dispatches it to the operating system for transmission. The reverse process is carried out 
for incoming messages.
Figure4.8: IPSec Protocol Handling Function
4.4. IPSec Security Management Information Base (IPSec SMIB)
Security services applied to IP traffic between a sender and a receiver are defined by 
a security association (SA). The SA is defined for one direction only; if a two-way 
relationship is required, then two SAs are required. In each IPSec implementation there is 
a security management information base (SMIB) that defines and manages the 
parameters associated with each security association (SA). Multiple SMIB entries may 
relate to a single SA, or one SMIB entry may relate to multiple SAs [43]. The SMIB is 
divided into segments, one segment for use by each IPSec functional layer. Content or 
form for the storage, implementation, or usage of information is not explicitly defined 
since it is highly dependent on the specifics of each individual IPSec implementation
[37].
Parameters that define a SA are [43]: sequence number counter, sequence number 
overflow, anti-replay window, AH/ESP information, lifetime of the SA, IPSec protocol 
mode (i.e., tunnel or transport), and path MTU.
Each SMIB entry is defined by SA selectors which enables the mapping of a 
particular SA to IP traffic. The following selectors are used [8]: destination/source IP
96
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
address, user ID, data sensitivity level, transport layer protocol, IPSec protocol (AH or 
ESP or AH/ESP), source and destination ports, IPv6 class, IPv6 flow table, and IPv4 type 
of service.
In addition to SA information, the SMIB may contain information such as control lists, 
IDs for networked resources, and session keys [37].
4.5 -  IPSec Functional Layers Summary
The proposed IPSec layered architecture is a highly configurable architecture with 
the inherent flexibility needed to realize redundancy and adaptation needed for 
atypical distributed computing scenario consisting of a collection of machines 
connected by local or wide-area communication network. Application level 
processes communicate by using a communication subsystem that typically 
consists of IP, some transport-level protocol such as TCP or UDP, and potentially, 
some middle were- level protocols. The designed IPSec system provides the 
abstraction of a bidirectional point-to-point communication channel for each 
connection that is opened. The design uses the established algorithms in the 
security mechanism layer to provide security guarantees for the needed security 
services layer. Each of these security services is associated with one or more 
software modules that implement the corresponding security feature. The design 
is configurable in the sense that specific modules can be selected based on user 
and application requirements. First, it allows the user to determine which IPSec 
property to use if a certain property is not required or if it is already implemented 
by some other system layer, then no module that implements the property needs to
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be included. Second, it allows the user to select which mechanism (or module) to 
use to implement a particular IPSec property. The user can evaluate the modules 
by various metrics, including the relative level of security and resource utilization.
All modules are synthetically independent from one another by virtue of 
the execution model supported by the IPSec processes, which means that any 
combination is synthetically valid. However, the different IPSec security 
properties have certain semantic dependencies and ordering constraints that are 
reflected as semantic dependencies and ordering constraints of intra-layers and 
inter-layers. In practice, these dependencies are recorded as a configuration graph 
that can be used to ensure any chosen IPSec configuration is semantically 
consistent.
4.6 Location of IPSec Architecture
Within a LAN, IP traffic is typically nonsecure since all of the systems in the network are 
part of the trusted network. IPSec operates in a networking device, such as a firewall or a 
router, that connects the LAN to the outside world [8]. The proposed architecture can be 
implemented on the networking device, or on a separate system that interfaces with the 
networking device.
A typical IPSec setup is depicted in Figure 4.9 below. In the figure, there is a LAN and a 
client system external to the LAN. Traffic within the LAN is nonsecure, but all traffic 
between the client system and LAN is secured using IPSec protocols. In this setup, the 
proposed architecture is implemented on its own system that interfaces with the network 
router of the LAN, while the architecture is part of the client system.
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Figure 4.9: Location of IPSec Architecture
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CHAPTER V: IPSec SCENARIOS
5.1 -  IPSec SCENARIOS
5.1.1 Scenario 1 (An IPSec Session Scenario)
Let us assume a remote IPSec client system wants to establish an IPSec transport 
connection to a remote server. The client chooses to use ESP encryption and 
authentication. However, before ESP can be used keys need to be exchanged between the 
client system and the remote server using ISAKMP.
It is assumed that the base ISAKMP message exchange type is used. Four messages 
are exchanged between the client and server in this scenario; the first two establish an SA 
between the two systems, and the second two exchange key information [43]. Also, it is 
assumed that Diffe-Hellman is the key exchange algorithm used, and HMAC-MD5-96 is 
used to authenticate messages where appropriate.
The following steps and Figure 5.1 illustrate how the first two messages that establish 
theSA would be threaded throught the proposed architecture.
t - <<)«
OS
Figure 5.1: SA Negotiation
1. The client system determines the parameters for the SA between itself and the server. 
The client system interfaces with the IPSec protocol handling function, and the dispatcher
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determines that ISAKMP will be used and passes the SA information to the ISAKMP 
MPU.
2. The ISAKMP MPU sends the SA data to the SMIB.
3. The ISAKMP MPU invokes the random number generator in layer 1 to obtain a nonce 
that is included in the initial ISAKMP message.
4. The message is passed on to the dispatcher for transmission to the remote server.
5. The client system receives a response (second message) from the server and passes it 
on to the IPSec protocol handling function. The dispatcher determines the data is a 
ISAKMP message and passes it on to the ISAKMP MPU.
6 . The MPU verifies that the parameters of the SA have been accepted; any changes are 
written to the SMIB.
The third message is from the client to the server and contains the key exhange material 
of the client. Creation of this message using the proposed architecture is explained in the 
following steps and illustrated in Figure 5.2.
rUNCTlON.
+
m
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Figure 5.2: Third Message of the ISAKMP Base Exchange
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1. The ISAKMP MPU invokes the confidentiality module in layer 3.
2. The confidentiality module invokes the Diffe-Hellman sub module of the key 
management module of layer 3.
3. The Diffe-Hellman module invokes the prime number generation and the modular 
arithmetic modules in layer 1 to choose a prime number and private key that is a 
primitive root of the prime number.
4. The Diffe-Hellman module invokes the modular arithmetic module in layer 1 to 
calculate the client's public key.
5. The ISAKMP MPU invokes the authentication module in layer 3.
6 . The authentication module invokes the HMAC sub module of the message 
authentication module of layer 2 .
7. The HMAC module invokes the MD5 submodule of the one-way hash module of layer 
1 to calculate the authentication value over the message.
8. The ISAKMP MPU passes the message that contains the public key and identity of the 
client system and the authentication data to the dispatcher. The dispatcher passes the 
message to the client system for transmission to the remote server.
The fourth message is from the server to the client. The client uses this message to obtain 
the key information of the server to establish the session key. The processing of this 
message using the proposed architecture is explained in the following steps and 
illustrated in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Fourth Message of the ISAKMP Base Exchange
1. The client system receives a response from the server and passes it on to the IPSec 
protocol handling function. The dispatcher determines the data is a ISAKMP message 
and passes it on to the ISAKMP MPU.
2. The MPU verifies the authentication data of the message by invoking the 
authentication module in layer 3.
3. The authentication module invokes the HMAC sub module of the message 
authentication module in layer 2 .
4. The HMAC sub module invokes the MD5 sub module of the one-way hash module in 
layer 1.
5. The MPU verifies that the calculated HMAC-MD-96 matches that contained in the 
message. The MPU verifies the identity of the server by comparing the ID in the message 
to that in the SMIB entry.
6. The MPU retrieves the server public key from the message and invokes the 
confidentiality module in layer 3.
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7. The confidentiality module invokes the Diffe-Hellman sub module of the key 
management module in layer 2 .
8. The Diffe-Hellman submodule invokes the modular arithmetic module in layer 1 to 
generate the secret key.
9. The secret key is stored in the SMIB; this key will be used as the session key to 
encrypt all subsequent messages.
Now that a session key has been generated, ESP authentication and encryption can now 
be applied using the proposed architecture. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.4 and 
explained in the following steps.
m
Figure 5.4: IPSec Example
1. The client system interfaces with the IPSec protocol handling function. The dispatcher 
determines the data will use ESP and passes the data onto the ESP MPU.
2. The ESP MPU invokes the confidentiality service in layer 3.
3. The IPSec confidentiality service in layer 3 invokes the symmetric encryption 
mechanism in layer 2. The encryption is applied to the IP payload.
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4. Let us assume that the algorithm used for encryption is DES; thus the DES function in 
the encryption fundamentals module in layer 1 is invoked. The key used for encryption is 
retrieved from the SMIB.
5. The ESP MPU now invokes the authentication service in layer 3.
6 . The authentication service relies on the IPSec authentication mechanism in layer 2.
The HMAC module of the message authentication module is invoked.
7. Asssume HMAC-MD5-96 is used for authentication. The HMAC module in layer 2 
calls the MD5 function of the one-way hash codes module in layer 1; the first 96 bits of 
the HMAC value are taken as the authentication data.
8. The authenticated and encrypted ESP message is passed on to the dispatcher which 
then interfaces with the operating system to transmit the data over the connection.
5.1.2 Scenario 2
Two hosts, A and B, with IP address 1.1.1.1 and 2.2.2.2 have established two SAs, 
SAi, SA2. (The SADB shown in the Figure 5.5 does not have all the fields. The 
sequence number, lifetime, and other fields have been left out). SAi is configured for 
ESP with 3DES and SA2 ESP with DES. This information is stored in the SPD.
SA] is used for very secure applications; such as banking, which runs on a TCP using 
port 1000. After IPSec processing, if the policy is not checked to determine if the 
banking application did in fact use 3DES, then security is compromised. The policy 
can be checked only after the IPSec processing as the selectors are not available 
before because they may be encrypted.
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SPD
From T o Protocol Port Policy
1.1.1.1 2.2.22 TCP 1000 ESP with3DES
— * 1.1.1.1 2.2.2J2 * *
ESP with
DES
Inbound SADB
Src D es Protocol SPI SA Record
— „ 22.2.2 1.1,1.1 ESP 10 84-bit 
DES Key
2,2.2.2 1.1.11 ESP 11 168-bit 
3DES Key
Figure 5.5: Flow of specific IPSec SMIB.
5.1.3 Scenario 3
Let us consider the example network diagram shown in Figure 5.6 For outbound 
processing, we will consider an HTTP packet (TCP, port 80) generated by host A 
destined to host B (a Web server) traversing routers RA and RB. The policy on A for 
packets destined to host B mandates using AH in transport mode using HMAC-MD5. 
The policy on router RA mandates that all packets destined to the network 2.2.2/24 be 
encrypted with ESP using 3DES and tunneled to RB.
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1 .1 ,1 ,1  S A r * -* r b  y:;,i* i»}''6 i6 .6 .©  2 . 2 2 , 2
A’sSPD
From To Protocol Port Policy
1.1.1.1 2.2.2.2 Any Any TransportAH with HMAC MD5
A’s Outbound SADB
Src Des Protocol SPI SA Record
1.1.11 2.2 .22 AH 10' MD5 Key SAa-»b
RA’s SPD
From To Protocol Port Policy Tunneldst
1.1.124 2,2.2/24 Any Any Tunnel ESP wits 3DES ©6.6.6
RA’s Outbound SADB
Src Des Protocol SPI SA record
5.5.5.5 6.6.6.6 . ESPTunnel 11 168-bit 3DES Key
SA ra->rb
Figure 5.6: Example of IPSec outbound processing.
5.2 -  IPSec Deployment
In this section, we are going to illustrate how the security services can of designed
IPSec system be used to provide different IPSec solutions.
Packet
Security
Gatewayi
SecurityiGateway
Peer Authentication Packet Integrity 
Data Encryption S ess io n  Re-Keying
Figure 5.7: Schematic of A security Gateway
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5.2.1- Virtual Private Network (VPN)
How do we ensure the safe passage of data across a shared infrastructure?
The answer is to deploy a secured virtual private network (VPN), VPNs are 
networks deployed on a public network infrastructure that utilize the same 
security, management, and quality of service policies that are applied in a 
private network. VPNs provide an alternative to building a private network for 
site to site communication over a public network or the Internet. Because they 
operate across a shared infrastructure rather than a private network, companies 
can cost effectively extend the corporate WAN to telecommuters, mobile users, 
and remote offices as well as to new constituencies, such as customers, 
suppliers, and business partners. Figure 5.4 shows the schematic of IPSec VPN 
configuration.
Branchoffice
IF Ssc VPNIP Sec VPN
■
C ustom er A
Internet iP/NlPIS networkRem ote access
Internet IPSeoi
a uetew ay
IPSoc VPN
C ustom er B
IPSec VPN
Teleoom m uw /SO H O
Figure 5.8: Schematic of IPSec VPN Configuration
Traditional private WANs connect customer sites via dedicated point to point links. 
This means that multiple independent circuits have to terminate at the corporate
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network egress, making the deployment nonscalable and difficult to maintain. VPNs 
extend the classic WAN by replacing the physical point to point links with logical 
point to point links sharing a common infrastructure, allowing all the traffic to be 
aggregated into a single physical connection. This scenario results in potential 
bandwidth and cost savings at the network egress. Because customers no longer need 
to maintain a private network, and because a VPN itself cheaper to own and offers 
significant cost savings over private WANs, operation costs are reduced.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Conclusion
The IPSec protocol provides the security functionality for interconnecting end systems 
across multiple networks. For this reason, IPSec is implemented in each end system and 
in network gateways, which provide connection between network. The implementation of 
IPSec should effectively support public key cryptography, open standards and interfaces, 
and bring together an otherwise dispersed security services into an integrated solution 
under a complete security management system.
In this thesis a framework for IPSec implementation architecture was developed. For our 
purposes, the developed IPSec implementation provides a useful overview of many of the 
concepts of network security that IPSec deals with, and it is flexible to allow for 
enhancement and future modifications. The developed architecture treats each security 
function as a “block box”. This has two benefits:
First, an existing implementation of a security “function” piece can be used as a 
“module” in implementing IPSec. In this way, the bulk of the IPSec required software 
code is prepackaged and ready to use with no or slight modification. Second, if it is ever 
desired to replace a given functionality in an IPSec implementation all that is required is 
to remove the existing “function module” and drop in the new module. This could be 
done if a new more efficient “function piece” were desired. More important, if the 
security of one of the embedded function pieces were compromised, the security of the 
overall IPSec implementation could be retained simply by replacing the affected 
embedded function piece with a more secure one.
The proposed IPSec functional architecture is useful to network security engineers as a 
way of managing and administering the task of provisioning the network IPSec 
requirements. Furthermore, because the development is a systematic way of structuring 
the IPSec functionality and standards, computer and communication vendors can benefit 
from it by developing products that related to this structured implementation of IPSec
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services and mechanisms. The IPSec services and the applications it supports are 
implemented as a collection of discrete modules. A certain set of modules may be 
developed by a particular vendor, while a different set of modules may be developed by 
another vendor. In addition, the modular structure of the implementation architecture 
lends itself to defining different version of each module. This in turn makes it possible to:
1) define alternative or enhanced capabilities for certain aspects of IPSec 
without needing to go to a new version of the entire standard (e.g., IPv6 
security), and
2) clearly specify coexistence and transition strategies.
6.2 Concluding Remarks
The realization approaches outlined for the IPSec functions in this thesis can 
provide customizable communication security by allowing the user to choose which 
security attributes are required for a connection and which algorithms are used to 
implement these attributes.
The proposed IPSec functional architecture can provide a highly configurable 
secure communication service with the inherent flexibility needed to realize redundancy 
and adaptation needed for a typical distributed computing environment consisting of a 
collection of machines connected by a local or wide-area communication network[49].
6.3 Future W ork
Future work shall include the development of a lab-grade prototype. Experimentation 
with the prototype and the development of a family of secure communication scenarios 
with different execution characteristics are to be performed. A special focus should be 
developing modules that are scalable and that minimize the synchronization required to 
support coordinated execution behavior. Performance analysis experiments should be 
preformed.
I l l
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Appendices
Appendix A1
o IPv4 Datagrams Format
An IP datagram consists of a header portion and a data portion. The header 
portion consists of a 20 bytes fixed part and a variable length optional part. The 
data portion is of variable length. Figure A.l shows the format of an IPv4 
datagram.
4 -  bits 
version
4 -  bits 
IHL
 32-bits
|12 16
8-bits type of service
1 6 -bits identifl cation
8-bitstimetolive 8 -  bits protocol
|20 124 128 31
16-bitstotal length
3 -bits 
flags 13 -  bits fragments off set
16 -bits checksum
32 -  bits source address
32 -bits destination address
Option (0 or more words length)
i Data (variable length)
Figure A.l: IPv4 datagram.
An IP datagram is transmitted in big endian byte order: from left to right, that is, 
lower order bytes are transmitted first. This is the byte ordering required for all 
binary integers in the TCP/IP headers as they traverse a network. This is called
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network byte order. Machines such as Pentiums, which uses little endian byte 
ordering format must convert header values to network byte order before 
transmitting the data.
- The version field indicates the version of the IP protocol that the data belongs. 
This field is usually use for backward compatibility.
- The EHL field is the length of the header in 32-bits words. The minimum value 
is 5 words(20 bytes) which is the case when no options are present: and the 
maximum value is 15 words (60 bytes) which applies when the options field is 40 
bytes.
- The type of service (TOS) field indicates the traffic requirement of the 
datagram in bytes. The maximum length is 65,535 bytes. This field is used in 
combination with the IHL field to indicate where the data portion of the IP 
datagram begins.
- The identification field allows a host to determine which datagram that a newly 
arrived fragment belongs to. Each datagram has a unique identification number, 
and each fragment of a datagram has the same identification number.
- Only 2 of the 3 bits flags are used. The first of the two bits is called the DF 
(don’t fragment) bit: it indicates whether or not the IP datagram should be 
fragmented. If this bit is set, it indicates that the datagram should not be 
fragmented. When a router receives a datagram with DF bit set, it usually sends 
back an ICMP message to the host from which the datagram originated indicating 
its MTU (Maximum Transfer Unit). This bit is therefore used to determine path
- MTU (path Maximum Transfer Unit): the maximum size of an IP datagram
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that will be allowed to pass through a given network path on route to the 
destination without been subjected to fragmentation.
- The next bit is called MF (more fragment) bit. This bit indicates when the last 
fragment of a datagram arrives. This bit is set for all of the fragments of a 
datagram except the last fragment.
The fragment offset tells where in the current datagram this fragment belongs. All 
fragments except the last one in a datagram must be a multiple of 8 bytes.
- The time to live (TTL) field is used to limit the life time of a datagram, thus 
preventing datagram from looping infinitely within a network segment. The TTL 
field is set to a default value by the host. Each router that the datagram passes 
through, decrements the TTL value by one. If a router receives a datagram with a 
TT1 value of 1, it discards the datagram and sends an ICMP message to the source 
indicating that the TTL value of the datagram has expired.
- The protocol field tells which transport protocol is used for the data 
encapsulated within the IP datagram. It allows destination hosts to demultiplex IP 
datagrams among the different transport protocols.
- The header checksum is computed on the IP header and is used to determine 
the integrity of the IP header. It should be noted that the checksum is not 
encrypted and it can easily be forged.
- The source and destination address fields indicate the 4 bytes IP address of 
the host that generated the datagram, and the destination host respectively.
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- The variable length options field carries optional information about a datagram 
such as the security and handling restriction. This field is rarely used and is 
usually ignored by most routers.
- The data portion of the IP datagram is of variable length and it contains the 
IP payload. For further detail regarding the format of the data or header portion of 
an IPv4 datagram refer to [30] which contains the official specification of IPv4 
protocol.
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o  IPv6 Datagram Format
IPv4 suffers from a major limitation :it limits IP address to 32 bits. With the current 
rate of growth of the Internet, there is a real possibility that if the size of IP addresses 
does not increase, then there might not be enough IP addresses to meet the demand. 
The designated successor of IPv4: IPv6 overcomes this limitation as well as 
simplifies the IP header and adds more flexibility to the IP datagram. Some of the 
changes from IPv4 to IPv6 are outlined below.
- IPv6 increases the IP address size from 32 bits to 128 bits, thus increasing the 
addressable nodes by many folds.
- The number of header fields is reduced from 13 in IPv4 to 7 in IPv6 . The smaller 
number of headers allows routers to process packets faster and therefore, increases 
throughput.
- IPv6 provides better support for options. The options are treated as separate 
headers instead of being a part to the IP header. This change allows routers to skip 
over headers that are not intended for them. This feature speeds up packet processing 
time; it also allows for less stringent limits on the length of options and provides 
greater flexibility for the introduction of new options in the future.
- IPv6 provides new capability to label packets belonging to particular traffic 
stream for which the sender requests special handling, such as non default quality of 
service.
- IPv6 does not support any fragmentation for packets in transit. The host that 
generates the packet must perform path MTU to ascertain the maximum size of the IP
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datagram that will be allowed to pass through the network segment on route to the 
destination host.
- IPv6 specified extension to support authentication, data integrity and(optional) 
data confidentiality.
Figure A. 1.2 shows the required IPv6 fixed headers.
32-NM
B 112_______ M®________g?_______124_______ 128 311
4 -b its
yerslo*
4-blts
Priori* 24-bfts flow label
16-bits payload length 8-blts next header S-bits hop limit
128-bits source address
128-bits destaatiou  address
Figure A.1.2: IPv6 Header Format.
- The version field is similar to IPv4 version field. The priority field is used to 
indicate the quality of service that a packet requires. The flow label field is still 
experimental, but is likely that it will be used in the future to set up a pseudo­
connection with particular properties and requirements [31].
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- The payload length is a 16 bit unsigned integer which indicates the length of the IP 
payload, that is, the rest of the packet following the IPv6 headers.
- The next header field identifies the type of header immediately following the IPv6 
header. This field facilitates the reduction in the number of fields in the IPv6 header 
compared to that of IPv4. It tells which extension header, if any, follows this one; if 
this header is the last IP header, it tells which transport protocol the packet should be 
passed to. For information on the number assigned to each protocol see [33]
- The hop limit field is the same as the TTL field in IPv4.
The source and destination address fields represent the 128-bits IPv6 addresses of the 
source and intended recipient of the packet, respectively.
o Extension Headers
IPv6 introduced the concept of optional extension headers. These headers can be 
supplied to provide additional information. There are currently 6 extension headers 
defined by IPv6, and each has a unique identification number (described in [33]).
The extension headers, if present, are inserted between the IPv6 header and the 
transport header. If more than one extension header is present, the order of the 
headers is important and should be as detailed in [32] (the original specification of 
IPv6).
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Appendix A2
Fields for the SA: 
- Sequence Number
“ This is a 32-bit number that is incremented by 1 every time SA is used to secure 
the communication” [5]. It is used by both parties for outbound processing and it 
is contained in the AH and ESP headers.
- Sequence Number Overflow
“ This field is set when the sequence number overflows” [5]. It is used by both 
parties to process outbound traffic. Once the overflow is occurred, IPSec policy 
decides whether the current SA can still be used for additional communication or 
a new SA should be established.
- Anti-replay Window
This field is used in inbound processing to control an important issue in 
networking which is replay attacks. IPSec defeats these attacks by detecting 
packets replayed by malicious hosts.
- Lifetime
Each SA has a lifetime associated with it that indicates when it can not be used 
any more. This lifetime is specified either in terms of number of bytes that have 
been secured using this SA, or the duration for which the SA has been used, or 
both.
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- Mode
This field identifies the mode of IPSec protocols which can be either a tunnel 
mode or transport mode. Table 2.1 shows an SA with example values.
Security Association Parameters Example Values
SPI 3219011
IP Destination Address 172.16.16.10
AH Mode Transport
AH Algorithm SHA-1
AH Key 196 bit SHA-1 Key length
ESP Mode Transport
ESP Algorithm 3DES
ESP key 168 bit 3DES key length
ESP Authentication Algorithm MD5
ESP Authentication Algorithm Key 96 bit MD5 key length
Life time 3600 sec
Table A2.1: Example of SA
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Appendix A3
The objects stored in Security Database:
1) Security Policy Database
The IPSec protocol mandates that the Security Policy Database (SPDB) must be 
consulted during the processing of all traffic, whether the traffic is inbound or 
outbound. The SPDB contains an order list of policy entries. Each entry is specified 
by the use of one or more selectors. The selectors the IPSec currently allows are:
o Destination IP address: The destination IP address can be a 32-bit IPv4 
or a 128-bit IPv6 address. The address can be a host IP address, a 
broadcast, unicast, anycast, a multicast group, a range of addresses, 
address plus netmask or wild card address. The destination IP address is 
obtained from the destination IP address field of the Authentication 
Header (AH) or the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header (s) or if 
IPSec is not applied to the packet the IP header, 
o Source IP address: The source IP address can be a 32-bit IPv4 or a 128- 
bit IPv6 address. The address can be a host IP address, a broadcast, 
unicast, anycast, a multicast group, a range of addresses, address plus 
netmask or wild card address. The destination IP address is obtained from 
the source IP address field of the AH or the ESP header(s) or if IPSec is 
not applied to the packet the IP header.
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o Transport layer protocol: Ther transport layer protocol is obtained from 
the IPv4”protocol” or the IPv6”next header” fields, 
o System name: The system name can be a fully qualified DNS name such 
as eep.mega.uwindsor.ca, a X.500 distinguished name or a X.500 general 
name.
o Use ID: The user ID can be a fully qualified DNS user name such as 
fah 1 @ece.uwindsor.ca or a X.500 distinguished name.
2) Security Association Database
The Security Association Database (SADB) contains the active Security Association 
(SA) entries. Each SA entry is indexed by a triplet consisting of a Security Parameter 
Index (SPI), a source or destination IP address and a IPSec protocol. In addition, a 
SADB entiy consists of the following fields:
o Sequence Number Counter: This is a 32-bit integer which is used to 
generate the sequence number field in AH or ESP headers, 
o Sequence Counter Overflow: This is a flag indicating whether the 
overflow of the Sequence Number Counter should be audited and the 
transmission of additional traffic be blocked for the given SA. 
o Anti- Replay Window: A 32-bit counter and a bit-map that is used to 
ascertain whether an inbound AH or ESP packet is replay, 
o AH authentication algorithms and required keys, 
o ESP Authentication algorithms and required keys, 
o ESP encryption algorithms, keys, Initial Vector(IV) and IV mode.
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o IPSec protocol mode: This field indicates which IPSec protocol mode 
(transport, tunnel or wild card) is applied to AH and ESP traffic, 
o Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU): Any observed PMTU and 
aging variables.
o Lifetime of the SA: This field contains the time interval within which a 
SA must be replaced by a new SA or be terminated, plus an indication of 
whether the SA should be replaced or terminated when it expires. The 
lifetime of a SA takes two forms: a time interval or byte count which 
represents the number of bytes that IPSec protocols has been applied to the 
parameter that expires first takes precedence.
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Appendix A4
o ISAKMP Header Format
ISAKMP message consist of a fixed length header followed by a variable number of 
payloads. The fixed-length header contains the necessary information for the protocol 
to maintain state and process the payloads. The ISAKMP header format is illustrated 
in Figure 3.16.
15
I
23
Initiator Cookie
Responder Cookie
Next Payload MajorVersion
Minor
Version Exchange Type
Message IP
Message Length
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Flags
Figure A.4.1: The ISKAMP Header Format
A description of the ISAKMP header fields follows.
- Initiator Cookie: This field contains a unique 8-bit integer that the initiator of the 
ISAKMP exchanges generates. This cookie is created by each peer and are used, along 
with the message ID, to identify the state that defines an ISAKMP exchange in progress.
The method of generating the cookies varies with different 
implementations of ISAKMP; however, the protocol specifies that the 
cookies, whether that of the initiator or responder, should be generated
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using secret information that is unique to the respective ISAKMP
communicating hosts, and it should not be possible to determine the secret
information from the cookie. In addition the cookie for each SA should be
unique. A possible method of generating cookies is to perform a hash
(using MD5 or SHA-1 hash function) of the concatenation of the source
and destination address, UDP source and destination ports, a locally
generated secret random number and the current date and time.
Responder Cookie: This field contains the responder’s 8-bit cookie. The
attributes of this cookie are similar to that of the initiator’s.
Next Payload: This is a 8-bit field that indicates the first payload in the message; 
it also indicates which of the various ISAKMP payloads immediately follows the 
header. Table A.4.1 shows the payload that ISAKMP currently defines.
Next Payload Type Assigned Value
NONE 0
Security Association 1
Proposal 2
Transform 3
Key Exchange 4
Identification 5
Certificate 6
Certificate Request 7
Hash 8
Signature 9
Nonce 10
Notification 11
Delete 12
Vendor 13
RESERVED 14-127
Private USE 128-255
Table A.4.1: Assigned Values for ISAKMP Payloads.
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- M ajor Version: This 4-bit field indicates the major version of the ISAKMP 
Protocol in use. The specification for ISAKMP specifies that an ISAKMP 
implementation should not accept packets with a Major or Minor Version that is 
larger than its own.
- Minor Version: This 4-bit field contains the protocol Minor Version number.
- Exchange Type: This 8-bit field indicates the type of exchange that the message 
comprises of. Table 3.2 shows the exchange types that ISAKMP currently 
defines.
Exchange Type Assigned Value
NONE 0
Base 1
Identity Protection 2
Authentication Only 3
Aggressive 4
Informational 5
ISAKMP Future Use 6-31
DOI Specific Use 32-239
Private Use 240-255
Table A.4.2: ISAKMP Exchange Type and Assigned Values
- Flags: This 8-bit field indicates specific options that are set for ISAKMP 
exchanges. The first 3 bits of this field are currently used, the others are set to 
zero before transmission.
■ E(Encryption Bit): which signifies that the payloads following the 
header are encrypted.
■ C(Commit Bit): which signifies that a peer wishes a notification of 
exchange completion.
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■ A(Authentication-only Bit): used primarily by those who wish to 
add key recovery to ISAKMP.
- Message ID: This is a 4-byte field which contains a random value generated by 
the initiator of phase 2 (which will be discussed later in this chapter) negotiation. 
It serves as a unique Message Identifier that is used to identify the protocol state 
during phase 2 negotiations.
- Message Length: This is a 4-byte field which indicates the length of the total 
message (header + payloads) in bytes.
o ISAKMP Payloads Formats 
Generic Payload Header
Each ISAKMP payload begins with a generic header. The Generic Payload 
Header clearly defines the boundaries of the payload and consequently allows the 
chaining of different payloads. Figure A.4.2 illustrates the Generic Payloads 
Header.
0 7 15 23 31
I
Next
Payload RESERVED Payload Length
Figure A.4.2: Generic Payload Header Format
A description of the Generic Payload Header fields follows.
- Next Pavload: This 8-bit field identifies the payload type that follows this 
payload. If the current payload is the last payload of the message, the Next 
Payload field will be set to 0.
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- RESERVED : This field is unused and it is set to 0.
- Payload Length: Contains the length in bytes of the current payload including 
the Generic Payload Header. This is a 2-byte field.
We will now discuss the ISAKMP payloads that IKE uses.
2) Security Association Payload
The Security Association Payload is used to negotiate SA and to indicate the 
Domain of Interpretation (DOI) under which the negotiation takes place. Figure 
A.4.3 illustrates the format of this payload.
0 r 1 5 23 31
I
Is! ext 
Payload RESERVED Payload Length
Domain of Interpretation (DOI)
Situation
Figure A.4.3: Security Association Payload Format.
The “Next Payload”, “ RESERVED” and “Payload Length” fields are similar to 
those of Generic Payload Header fields.
- Domain of Interpretation (POD: This 4-byte field contains a 4-byte unsigned 
integer which identifies the DOI under which the negotiation is taking place. A 
DOI defines payload formats, exchange types and convention for naming relevant 
information such as cryptographic algorithms, modes, etc.
- Situation: This variable length field identifies the Situation under which the 
negotiation is taking place. A Situation is the set of information that will be used 
to determine the required security service.
132
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3) Proposal Payload
The Proposal Payload contains information used during the SA negotiation. This 
payload provides the framework for the initiator of the ISAKMP exchange to 
present to the recipient the preferred security protocol(s) and associated security 
mechanisms desired for the SA being negotiated. The Proposal Payload is 
illustrated in Figure A.4.4.
0 r 15 23 31
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Next
Payload RESERVED Payload Length
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Number Protocol- ID SPI Size
Number of 
Transforms
Variable- length SPI /
 ]
Figure A.4.4: Proposal Payload Format
A description of the Proposal Payload fields follows. The “Next Payload” 
RESERVED” and “Payload Length” fields are similar to those described in the 
payloads that we discussed previously.
- Proposal Number: This 8-bit field contains the identification number of the 
proposal for the current payload. The Proposal Number allows the peers that are 
involved in the SA establishment negotiation to present preferences to its 
communication peers in the form of logical AND or OR operations. For example, 
if the initiator of the exchange wishes to inform the other peer that it desires a 
combined protection suite consisting of ESP encryption with Triple-DES and 
authentication with HMAC-SHA-1, and AH authentication with HMAC-MD5, it 
would send a message that contains three Proposal Payloads, each with the same 
Proposal Number. If however, the peer needs to transmit the information that it
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requires either ESP authentication with HMAC-MD5 or AH authentication with 
HMAC-SHA-1, it would send a message consisting of two Proposal Payloads, 
each with monotonically increasing Proposal Number. The Proposal Number here 
indicates the order of preference of the proposals: The greater the preference, the 
smaller the proposal number.
- Protocol- ID: This 8-bit field contains the protocol identifier (example 50 for 
ESP and 51 for AH).
- SPI Size: Contains the length in bytes of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) of 
the protocol specified by the Protocol-ID field. If the protocol is ISAKMP, the 
SPI is the initiator-responder cookie pair. This field is a 8-bit field.
- Number of Transform: This 8-bit field gives the number of Transforms for the 
proposal. Each of the transforms specified is embodied in a Transform Payload.
- SPI: This variable-length field contains the source node SPI.
4) Transform Payload
The Transform Payload provides the framework for the initiating peer to present 
different security mechanisms for a given protocol during the negotiation to 
establish a SA. The proposal payload identifies a protocol for which services are 
being negotiated. The Transform Payload allows the initiating peer to present the 
supported transform or mode of operation of the proposed protocol. Figure A.4.5 
illustrates the format of the Transform Payload.
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Figure A.4.5: Transform Payload Format
A description of the Transform Payload fields follows.
- Next Payload: The 8-bit Next Payload field identifies the payload type that 
follows the current payload. This field will either contains the value 3 or 0. If 
another Transform Payload follows the current Transform Payload, the value in 
this field will be 3; if however the current Transform Payload is the last one for 
the proposed protocol, the value in this field will be 0 .
- Reserved: Similar to the “RESERVED” field in the payloads previously 
discussed.
- Payload Length: Similar to the “Payload Length” field in the payloads 
previously discussed.
- Transform number: This 8-bit field identifies the Transform Number for the 
current payload. If there are more than one transform for the proposed protocol, 
each transform will be embodied in a Transform Payload and each transform is 
identified by a m onotonically increasing num ber. The transform s are ordered 
according to the initiating peer’s preference: the most desired transform has the 
lowest Transform Number.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- Transform-ID; This 8-bit field specifies the transform identifier for the proposed 
protocol.
- Reserved2; This 16-bit field is unused and is set to 0.
- SA Attributes: This variable-length field contains the Security Association 
attributes for the Transform specified by the Transform-ID field.
5) Key Exchange Payload
The key Exchange Payload supports various key exchange protocols.
Figure A.4.6 illustrates the key Payload.
Figure A.4.6: Key Exchange Payload Format
The “Next payload”, “ RESERVED” and “Payload Length” fields are similar to 
those of the payload previously discussed. The key Exchange Data field is of 
variable length and it contains the data required to generate a session key. The 
DOI for the respective key exchange specifies the format and the interpretation of 
the data in this field.
6) Identification Payload
The Identification Payload allows communicating peers to exchange identity 
information. Figure A.4.7 illustrates the format of this payload.
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Figure A.4.7: Identification Payload Format.
The “Next Payload”, “RESERVED” and “Payload Length” fields are similar to 
those of the payload previously discussed.
- ID Type: This 8-bit field contains the type of identification being used, and it 
depends on the DOI of the respective key exchange.
- DOI Specific II) Data: This 24-bit field contains DOI specific identification data.
- Identification Data: This variable-length field contains identification information 
specified by the DOI of the key exchange. The ID Type field specifies the format 
of the information in this field.
7) Certificate Payload
The Certificate Payload allows communicating peers to exchange certificate or 
certificate-related material. Figure A.4.8 illustrates the format of this payload.
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Figure A.4.8: Certificate Payload Format
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The “ Next Payload”, “ RESERVED” and “ Payload Length” fields are again, 
similar to those of the payload previously discussed.
- Certificate Encoding: This 8-bit field identifies the kind of certificate or 
certificate-related information the “ Certificate Data” field contains.
- Certificate Data: This variable-length field contains the actual certificate data for 
the certificate type specified in the “Certificate Encoding” field.
8) Hash Payload
The Hash Payload contains the data generated by the hash function selected during
the SA negotiation. Figure A.4.9 illustrates the format of this payload.
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Figure A.4.9: Hash Payload Format
The “Hash Data” field contains the message digest that resulted from the 
application of the hash function to the input data.
9) Signature Payload
The Signature Payload contains the data generated by the signature function 
negotiated for the SA: and it is used to verify the integrity of the data in an 
ISAKMP message. The format of this payload is illustrated in figure A.4.10
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Figure A.4.10: Signature Payload Format
The “Signature Data “field is of variable length and it contains the signature data 
that resulted from the signing of the ISAKMP message using the digital signature 
algorithm negotiated for the SA.
10) Nonce Payload
The Nonce payload contains some pseudo - random information necessary used to 
protect the exchange data against replay. Figure A.4.11 illustrates this payload.
15 23 31
Next
Payload RESERVED Payload Length
Nonce Data ]
Figure A.4.11: Nonce Payload Format
The variable- length Nonce Data” field contains the random data generated by the 
communicating peer that is sending the message.
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A ppendix B 
Preshared Keys Overview and Types
The same preshared key is configured on each IPSec peer. The preshared key is 
combined with the Diffie- Heilman key, initiator, and responder’s nonce and cookie (this 
is an 8-byte pseudorandom number unique to each peer and the particular exchange in 
which it is defined) to form the authentication key. The authentication key is combined 
with device-specific information and sent through a hash algorithm to obtain HASH_I 
(initiator’s hash value) and HASH_R (responder’s hash value). IKE peers authenticate 
each other by exchanging and decoding HASHI and HASHR. If the receiving peer is 
able to independently recreate the same hash, the peer is authenticated. Each local peer 
must authenticate its remote peer before the tunnel is considered secure.
The preshared key is used during IKE (ISAKMP) phase 1 (main mode) to authenticate 
the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) shared secret exchange. There are three types of preshared 
keys: unique, group, and wildcard. Unique preshared keys are fixed to a specific IP 
address. They are defined for paris of peers when the IP addresses of the peers are known 
initially. Group preshared keys are tied to a group name identity; these are applicable 
only to remote access. Wildcard preshared keys are not coupled with any unique 
information to determine a peer’s identity. They are valid with any other device, as long 
as that device is also defined to use the same key value. Any devices that have the key 
will authenticated successfully. When using wildcard preshared keys, every device in the 
network uses the same key. If a single device in your network is compromised and the 
wildcard preshared key has been gathered, then all devices are compromised. Readers are
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strongly advised to avoid deploying wildcard preshared keys for site-to-site device 
authentication.
Preshared keys are simple to implement if your secured network is small (fewer than 
ten nodes). However, they do not scale well with a large or growing network. Depending 
on how strong the preshared keys are and how often they are replaced, they may not 
provide strong device authentication. In fact, preshared key is the least secure of the three 
different authentication methods.
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